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ABSTRACT 
Amidst the global economic recession and sizeable injections of federal stimulus 
packages, the U.S. Navy’s budget for ship construction has experienced only modest real 
growth.  While the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review has reaffirmed a fleet size goal of 
313 ships, some suggest that $20 billion or more per year is needed to attain this level of 
strategic resources.  This research has analyzed the United States’ shipbuilding industry 
as a potential source of economic stimulus using measures applied in the United 
Kingdom by economists at Oxford Economics.  First, monetary impacts from the “ship 
building and repairing” sector were analyzed using U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) input/output data and the “Leontief inversion process” modeled at Carnegie 
Mellon University.  This sector was compared with five alternative investments.  Second, 
the benefits of the shipyard-related labor market were analyzed using data from the BEA 
and Naval Sea Systems Command.  Measures of capital intensity and capacity were then 
applied to companies representing five industries.  The results suggest that U.S. 
shipbuilding generates monetary benefits comparable to alternatives, while supporting 
more labor than other sectors.  Finally, excess capacity shows a clear ability to absorb an 
increase in demand, providing prompt and positive impact on sustainable economic 
recovery. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
In 2008 and 2009, the United States’ economy struggled with what has widely 
been described as “the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression.”  Specifically, 
the national economic data show a reduction of 1.7% in real gross domestic product 
(GDP), measured in constant 2005 dollars, since the beginning of calendar year 2008 
(BEA, 2009).  Although this contraction may seem slight, this is the first six-quarter 
period since 1982 that the national GDP growth has been negative.  Now, with the 
nationwide unemployment rate near 10%, the United States has lost over 7.3 million jobs 
since the start of the damaging recession (Homan, 2009).  Some economists are 
predicting recovery in 2010, but national leaders and decision makers continue to look to 
spending by the federal government as a means of stimulating job growth, injecting 
stability, and sustaining recovery. 
In a series of efforts to mitigate drastic economic decline, the U.S. Congress 
passed a $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) package in October 2008, 
followed by the $787 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) on 
February 13, 2009 (Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, 2009).  Of the 
initial TARP package, about $550 billion has been committed to various financial firms, 
banks, and institutions throughout the country; so far, $70.1 billion has been returned to 
the Treasury (Ericson, He & Schoenfield, 2009).  The Federal Reserve and the  
White House continue to seek proper locations for depositing large sums of federal 
dollars as a means of ensuring continued, consistent recovery of our national economic 
forecasts.  As recently as December 8, 2009, the New York Times featured a front-page 
article in which White House economist Jared Bernstein suggested that the administration 
is considering an additional $150 billion in stimulus spending, of which $50 billion could 
be invested “in infrastructure projects alone such as roads, bridges, and water projects” 
(Pace, Taylor & Elliott, 2009).  Additionally, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) has stated that President Obama believes “we need to rebuild and retrofit 
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America for the demands of the twenty-first century 21st Century” (Orszag, 2009).  
Furthermore, in a letter to the Senate Majority Leader dated February 2009, the Director 
of the OMB stated that this rebuilding and retrofitting will “entail repairing and 
modernizing roads and mass transit options across the country” (Orszag, 2009).  Clearly, 
national leaders are convinced that boosting federal spending is one of the best tools for 
ensuring that America’s $14.3 trillion1 economy remains healthy and growing at a stable, 
sustainable pace.  The questions now being discussed in various offices and conference 
rooms throughout Washington, DC, and the country as a whole include robust debates 
about where to invest these funds.  What effects will a $1 trillion health care package 
have on our weakened economy?  Where are the benefits of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act; where have they been manifested?  The executive branch claims to 
track every dollar spent under this $787 billion umbrella, but how is that spending really 
benefiting the economy?  Other, perhaps equally important, questions exist for industries 
and sectors yet to benefit from federal spending packages and stimulus measures—what 
could investments in those sectors be doing to improve the economy? 
One important industry that has not received direct funding from government 
intervention in the current recession has been the U.S. shipbuilding sector.  A search for 
“shipbuilding” at the federal government’s Web site, which is designed to provide 
transparency to American citizens, reveals that a mere $132,000 of the $787 billion 
package has been allocated to a company called Horizon Shipbuilding in Alabama 
(Recovery, 2009).2  This $132,000 payment from the Department of Transportation is the 
only evidence of ARRA funding for shipbuilding; thus, not even 1/10 of 1% of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act has been invested in shipbuilding companies.   
Those with an interest in the U.S. shipbuilding industry believe that their particular 
sector of manufacturing has a special ability to provide economic stimulus for national 
decision makers and taxpayers alike.  The purpose of this thesis is to determine the return 
or benefit to the U.S. national economy for federal expenditures in the shipbuilding 
                                                 
1 Based on gross domestic product (GDP), the seasonally adjusted, annualized amount for the 3rd 
quarter of 2009 (BEA, 2009). 
2 Search was conducted at www.recovery.gov, a Web site with a mission statement to “provide easy 
access to data related to Recovery Act spending and allow(s) for the reporting of potential waste, fraud, and 
abuse” (Recovery, 2009). 
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sector.  Applying commonly used economic models, discussed in detail in the pages that 
follow, to pertinent macroeconomic data will help to make this determination.  As 
politicians seek to stimulate and sustain U.S. economic growth, they hope to create or 
maintain jobs, expand national gross domestic product, and provide a lasting resource for 
future economic potential; investments in shipbuilding may accomplish all three goals, as 
this study will seek to demonstrate. 
B. PROBLEM 
1. Problem 1: U.S. Navy Fleet Size: An Uncharted Goal 
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) has repeatedly affirmed a commitment to 
maintain a United States naval fleet of at least 313 warships (McIntire, 2009).  However, 
the 30-year Shipbuilding Plan for fiscal year 2011 does not include 313 ships for the U.S. 
naval fleet until the year 2020 (Director, 2010).  There is apparently a sharp discrepancy 
between these CNO estimates of national needs for our naval fleet and the projected fleet 
decline, if funding for ship construction remains constant in real dollars.  An estimate 
from the American Shipbuilding Association suggests that our fleet could drop to a mere 
180 ships if additional funding for ship construction is not received (see Figure 1).  
Another study by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) suggests 
that the congressional appropriation for Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) 
would have to be funded to levels of about $20.4 billion in order to achieve the Navy’s 
desired force structure in future years (Work, 2009).  The same CSBA study references 
recent Congressional Budget Office estimates that a total of $22.4 billion per year would 
be required to reach a fleet size of 313 ships by 2013.  Finally, the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) has estimated that by 2020, $25 billion will be needed annually for ships.  
In stark contrast to these projected levels for achievement of the CNO’s fleet size goal, 
$12.7 billion was the total funding of the fiscal year 2009 SCN account.  Based on CSBA 
estimates, the effort was underfunded by about 35% (DoN, 2008).  Additionally, the 30-




with expected future defense budgets, the Department of the Navy’s annual shipbuilding 
construction (SCN) budget must average no more than $15.9 billion per year in FY2010 
dollars” (Director, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 1.   Unilateral Navy Trends Graph (From ASA, 2009) 
 
The ostensible likelihood is that barring any geopolitical events that may punctuate 
the national security equilibrium, the United States Navy is not likely to reach a fleet of 
313 ships before the year 2040.  In addition, the academic and practical arenas of 
shipbuilding cost growth and projected-fleet-size funding estimates have been thoroughly 
explored by talented minds with reliable experience.  For these reasons, primarily, this 
thesis study will not explore issues of (1) appropriate fleet size to meet national security 
needs, or (2) the rising costs of ship construction as it impacts efforts to reach projected 
needs.  Although both of these issues are considered important, thorough and credible 
studies by congressional experts such as Mr. Ronald O’Rourke of the Congressional 
Research Service, RAND, and others have been and currently are being conducted within 
these arenas; this thesis will focus elsewhere. 
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2. Problem 2: What Does Shipbuilding Do for the Economy?  How? 
A second important problem exists within the topics of U.S. naval fleet size, 
national economic woes, and ship construction—a more obscure, but perhaps more 
solvable problem.  That issue is: what are the economic benefits of building ships?  When 
comparing the alternative options for investing federal taxpayer dollars—for example, 
building highways versus bailing out banks—several important questions are at the 
forefront of consideration.  First, what is the health and capacity of the industry being 
considered for receipt of billions of dollars?  Could the sector accept the billions of 
dollars of additional funding and apply them to an economic benefit for others?  Does the 
industry have the necessary capital and labor in place?  Are there resources or vendors 
whose financial health depends upon the sector considered?  For instance, building 
highways requires not only large pools of available labor, but also purchases from 
blacktop/concrete producers, perhaps equipment rentals for steamrollers and forklifts, and 
other suppliers who would benefit from increased demand of their products.  Are there 
similar supply-chain benefits for the builders of ships?  Investments of federal tax dollars 
should be allocated to the sectors in which they would economically benefit the most 
people, or provide the most activity for the U.S. economy. 
When evaluating a particular industry for its ability to enhance national economic 
recovery and growth, one should consider the channels through which the benefits will be 
manifest.  In determining channels of impact, quantitative multipliers should be 
calculated.  Once a trusted and scrutinized economic multiplier is available for each 
investment option, public-sector decision makers could be as well informed as private-
sector investment bankers or venture capitalists who seek to deposit their wealth where it 
will multiply the greatest, earn the most rewards, and pay dividends to their stakeholders 
for future periods.  Political leaders seeking to stabilize and grow the U.S. economy could 
evaluate the economic return for various investment options using a similar framework; 
their stakeholders are all U.S. citizens, and their wealth is the measure of national GDP.  
Here, the public-sector problem of where to invest the billions of available dollars for 
“recovery and reinvestment” could be considered in the context of economy activity 
generated and jobs created or supported. 
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C. SCOPE OF THESIS STUDY 
1. What Is Not Included, and Why? 
From both a quantitative and qualitative perspective, this study will primarily 
consider the U.S. shipbuilding and repairing industry.3  Thus, issues of rising 
construction and procurement costs of Navy ships will not be a focus of this study.  
Rather, benefit to the regional and national economy will be explored, quantified 
where possible, and analyzed through specific measures of economic analysis. 
Although required by Title 10 of the United States Code, the Navy’s 30-year 
Shipbuilding Plan for fiscal year 2010 was not submitted to Congress in 2009; it was 
deferred pending the completion of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which was 
concluded in February 2010 (O'Rourke, 2009).  The mix of vessels to be procured has 
been planned, and the evaluation of shipbuilding costs is being thoroughly scrutinized by 
national authorities on the subject such as Ronald O’Rourke, who is with the 
Congressional Research Service.4  With the latest publication of the Nuclear Posture 
Review, the QDR, the 30-year Shipbuilding Plan, and the President’s Fiscal Year 2011 
Budget, much light has been shed on the path ahead for U.S. shipbuilding and naval fleet 
size.  This thesis will not attempt to make a contribution to the analysis of rising ship 
costs, proper mix and type of vessels to be procured, or consideration of the national 
funds available for ship construction.  Rather, the study will focus on exploring (1) 
through what means, and (2) how much the shipbuilding industry benefits regional 
economies and the national economic health. 
2. How Shipbuilding Is Unique 
Through decades of active service, a United States warship provides much more 
than just security to the nation, forward presence abroad, and support of free trade on the 
high seas.  Although all of these contributions are certainly of profound economic and 
                                                 
3 As classified by North American Industrial Classification System’s (NAICS) 6-digit sector code 
#336611. 
4 Mr Ronald O’Rourke is a specialist in naval affairs with the Congressional Research Service, and has 
published numerous studies regarding the rising costs of Navy ships for the U.S. Navy, as well as analysis 
of other nations’ ship-procurement programs; most are available at www.crs.gov.   
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national interest, the geopolitical nature of each contribution will not be further explored 
in this particular study.  Here, though, as the shipbuilding industry is compared and 
contrasted with alternative investment options, a few important and unique qualities of a 
ship must be highlighted upfront.   
Each ship class has an approved maintenance plan that sets future dates for 
overhauls and refit periods through its end-of-life.  Additionally, during the decades of 
service, technological upgrades and modernization installs require equipment purchases 
from vendors in dozens of states.  Nuclear refueling or conventional ship overhauls 
employ hundreds of workers in highly paid positions of delicately skilled labor at 
shipyards throughout the country.  One recent study by Naval Sea Systems Command’s 
Portfolio Assessment Team (NAVSEA PAT) suggests that the average shipyard 
employee’s contribution to state GDP is six to nine times higher than the average state 
worker (Wright & Fields, 2009).  Not only are these shipyard jobs dependable and high 
paying, but also the induced effects of skilled labor’s contribution to local and state GDP 
are more economically influential than alternative sectors, as this study will 
demonstrate.  For each ship that is constructed, 30 or 40 years of maintenance and 
support is provided from shipyards and repair facilities, each time with additional 
economic activity generated.  The economic impacts of shipbuilding throughout the 
supply chain and the U.S. economy will only grow and compound as more ships are built.  
As compared to an automobile or a tank, which doesn’t exist for as long and doesn’t 
require as much maintenance or as many upgrades, technology insertions, or manning, 
ships repeatedly contribute their multipliers of economic benefit, providing stimulus and 
jobs to their regions and to the nation. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
In any credible study or analysis, the lessons of history should not be ignored.  
The U.S. shipbuilding industry has a particularly fascinating history, filled with many 
“highs and lows.”  An overview of the industry’s current status is imperative to analyzing 
its potential for national economic benefit now and in the future.  For instance, pertinent 
questions may include the following: how utilized are our shipyard facilities?  Have they 
“withered on the vine” amidst recent years of declining demand, or have they managed to 
continue necessary investments in capital facilities and infrastructure to remain 
competitive?  Ultimately, the integrity of the final argument will be contingent upon a 
thorough exploration of why ships are unique as a product that can be manufactured.  A 
central focus of this study will be to demonstrate how these unique economic attributes of 
ship construction and operation translate into national stimulus and impact.  Thus, this 
section includes a history of U.S. shipbuilding, a brief description of the shipbuilding 
industry today, and a fundamental depiction of how and why ships are unique from 
satellites, tanks, highways, and other procurement or manufacturing opportunities. 
A. HISTORY 
 The United States shipbuilding industry is one of the oldest in the country, and 
one with a dramatic and notable history.  According to Mr. William Walters in his 2000 
article in the Geographic Review, the American Navy at the end of the nineteenth century 
had atrophied to the point of mere “international insignificance” (p. 2).  Starting in 1885, 
the U.S. Congress began a transformational initiative to fund the “new Navy,” with a key 
component being a legal requirement for almost all American ships to be built in 
domestic shipyards with domestic purchases for supplies and equipment (Meyers, 2009).  
Following decades of fairly uneventful naval construction, the United States successfully 
mounted, during the years of 1930 to 1949, “the largest naval shipbuilding effort by any 
nation in the history of the world” (Walters, 2000).  In this time period, over 1.5 million 
American workers were employed by the shipbuilding industry, and over 550 full-sized 
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destroyers and over 1,051 newly designed tank-landing ships were produced.  In more 
recent times, shipbuilding has faced modern challenges and difficulties from various 
sources. 
 As a direct result of commercial shipbuilding alone in the United States, the 
nation’s 2001 measure of gross domestic product (GDP) was increased by $11 billion, 
while more than 147,000 total jobs were created5 (LECG, 2002).  However, the years that 
followed reflect a tumultuous journey for domestic shipbuilders, one in which uncertainty 
prevailed and the future looked repeatedly bleak.  As congressional priorities shifted to 
deficit reduction, overcapacity was rampant in shipyards.  Even time-tested companies 
lacked the demand stability to govern investment decisions in skilled labor-manning, 
infrastructure, and vendor-bases throughout the country (Barnard, 2005).  By early 2006, 
the Navy released its intentions to cut its 2006 shipbuilding plan by 1/3 of the estimate, 
eliminating two of the six ships that the industry had expected to build in that upcoming 
year.  The result was not only high unit costs per vessel, but also instability throughout 
the industry and the supply chain, which permeated the corporate culture and created an 
atmosphere of volatility. 
B. TODAY 
 As recently as 2001, the Navy had 318 battle-force warships, while today the fleet 
size is 286 (Navy.mil, 2010).  Even more disturbing are the projected trends for future 
ship numbers—perhaps as low as 180 ship in the U.S. fleet by 2024, if funding for ship 
construction is not increased in real dollars (ASA, 2009).  The American Shipbuilding 
Association makes the following assessment:   
Years of underinvestment in shipbuilding has resulted in a major 
contraction of the industry. Thousands of jobs have been lost and scores of 
companies have exited the shipbuilding business. As a result, for many of 
the critical systems and components that make a ship, there is only one 
remaining U.S. manufacturer left in the business. (2009, p. 2) 
 
                                                 
5 All measures are in 2001 dollars (LECG, 2002). 
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The existence of only one U.S. manufacturer for a critical part presents ostensible 
concerns for cost management and Department of Defense acquisition program 
managers.   
1. The Navy’s Unique Role—Sea Control 
 Over 70% of our planet is covered by oceans in a global political and trade 
climate that seems to shrink almost daily; the United States’ ability to project presence 
abroad is dependent upon access to all corners of the globe.  George Friedman comments 
in his book The Next 100 Years: 
[T]he single most important geopolitical fact in the world [is] the United 
States controls all of the world’s oceans. No other power in history has 
been able to do this. And that control is not only the foundation of 
America’s security but also the foundation of its ability to shape the 
international system. ... At the end of the day, maintaining its control of 
the world’s oceans is the single most important goal for the United States 
geopolitically. (2009, pp. 42–45) 
In support of the goal of ensuring continued sea control, Admiral Mullen, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs, and others have suggested that, along with our allies, we strive 
ultimately towards a 1,000-ship Navy, while diligently persisting with maritime security 
and cooperative engagement (McGuire, 2009).  However, as discussed in Problem 1 of 
the Introduction, the current and projected funding levels for ship construction do not 
support the current goals of 313 vessels in the fleet.  Still, the naval service remains the 
only national asset with the ability to project U.S. presence abroad, protect vital trade 
routes, and police the world’s vast ocean resources. 
2. Today’s United States Shipbuilding Industry 
 The 2009 U.S. shipbuilding industry itself employed over 300,000 people in 49 
states (ASA, 2009).6  Although there are more than 4,000 companies throughout these 49 
states that manufacture ship systems and components, the core defense-industrial-
shipbuilding base consists of six shipyards owned by just two companies—General 
                                                 
6 Wyoming is the only state not represented in the ASA’s “nationwide distribution of shipyards and 
suppliers.” 
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Dynamics and Northrop Grumman.  The Newport News, Virginia, site of Northrop 
Grumman (NG) is the sole builder of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers; Newport News 
and General Dynamic’s (GD) Electric Boat in Groton, Connecticut, are the only two 
locations where nuclear submarines are built.  The other members of the so-called “big 
six” shipyards are Bath Iron Works (GD), Ingalls (NG), Avondale (NG), National Steel 
and Shipbuilding Company, and NASSCO (GD).  Conventional surface combatants are 
built at Bath Iron Works and Ingalls, while Avondale and NASSCO construct naval 
auxiliary ships; Avondale and Ingalls build amphibious assault ships.  In Mississippi, 
with over 10,900 employees, Ingalls Shipbuilding is the state’s largest private employer 
(NG, 2009).   
 Government-run, public shipyards play an important role in the industry as well.  
In Hawaii, “Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (PHNSY) and Intermediate Maintenance 
Facility (IMF)” is “the largest industrial employer in the state of Hawaii, with a combined 
civilian and military workforce of over 4,700” people and an operating budget of $687 
million, which includes $426 million in payroll (Honolulu Advertiser, 2010).   
C. OTHER NATIONS’ SHIP PROCUREMENT 
 Several countries have economies now growing at a faster rate than our own.  The 
QDR itself points out that India is now the world’s fastest growing democracy, while 
China is the world’s most populous nation (DoD, 2010).  In fact, China’s economy grew 
by 8.7% in 2009, while the U.S. economy contracted by 2.4% (NBS, 2009; BEA, 2010).  
Today, more than 90% of U.S. imports and exports are transported by ships, and nearly 
40% of the world’s oil supply is shipped through the Straits of Hormuz (U.S. Energy, 
2008).  Additionally, the last decade has seen the resurgence of the real threat of pirates 
and sea-based terrorists entering the oceans, particularly off the coast of Somalia.  
Developing as well as many developed nations are realizing the strategic importance of 
building and maintaining robust, healthy navies with the latest technologies and with the 
ability to protect national interests. 
 In countries in which economic growth has allowed for newfound resources to be 
allocated, several governments have chosen to build vessels as an appropriate investment 
 
 13
for government spending.  Mr. O’Rourke summarizes the following in the background 
section of his November 23, 2009, Congressional Research Service report regarding 
China’s naval modernization: 
China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon 
acquisition programs, including programs for anti-ship ballistic missiles 
(ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack cruise missiles 
(LACMs), surface-to-air missiles, mines, manned aircraft, unmanned 
aircraft, submarines, destroyers and frigates, patrol craft, amphibious ships 
and craft, mine countermeasures (MCM) ships, and supporting C4ISR6 
systems. In addition, observers believe that China may soon begin (or 
already has begun) an indigenous aircraft carrier construction program. (p. 
2) 
Between 1995 and 2007 China placed into service a total of 38 submarines, which 
averages a rate of 2.9 per year.  In Russia, the government recently approved a  
$60 billion naval-shipbuilding rearmament plan (ASA, 2009).  In addition, the Indian 
government has prioritized manufacturing as a way of pulling the country out of poverty, 
and the Indian Ministry of Shipping has announced a $1.8 billion investment plan in four 
shipyards by 2017.   India’s annual GDP is $1.22 trillion, less than 10% of the annual 
U.S. GDP (World Bank, 2009).7 
D. HOW SHIPS ARE ECONOMICALLY UNIQUE 
Ultimately, any analysis of the benefits of investing in shipbuilding and a larger 
fleet size must directly highlight how ships distinguish themselves from other defense 
and non-defense investment alternatives.  There are at least four main ways that ships are 
distinguishable from other options such as tanks, bridges, and highways.  First and 
foremost, a ship offers a recurring economic benefit as it is updated, maintained, and 
modernized during its 30- 40-year life cycle.  Unlike a tank or bridge, a ship receives 
millions of dollars of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technology insertions as well as 
scheduled engineering overhauls, new equipment installs, and refueling availabilities.  
Each of these evolutions provides a specially trained and highly skilled group of laborers 
                                                 
7 Based on 2008 levels, as measured in U.S. dollars by the World Bank.  India ranks 12th in the world 
in GDP, and the U.S. ranks 1st (World Bank, 2009). 
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with employment opportunities.  Secondly, the value of the jobs created by the 
shipbuilding industry are clearly far above the economic value (measured as a factor of 
state GDP per capita) of the average job, as presented in chapter 4 in the NAVSEA 
Portfolio Assessment Team’s study.  Thirdly, the capital intensity of the shipbuilding 
industry is substantially high, regardless of the measurement technique used (Lim, 2007).   
 One aspect in which shipbuilding is not necessarily unique, but certainly 
threatened, is the recent (twenty-first century) atrophy of skills throughout its supporting 
industrial and supplier base.  American leaders have become aware of the importance of 
keeping an industrial base capable and qualified to meet the defense security needs of the 
future.  In May 2009, Congress passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 
2009, in which Title 10 of the United States Code is amended by adding the following 
new paragraph (6) at the end of section 2501(a): 
SEC. 303. EXPANSION OF NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES OF 
THE NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL BASE. 
(a) Maintaining critical design skills to ensure that the armed forces are 
provided with systems capable of ensuring technological superiority over 
potential adversaries. 
In short, this amendment emphasizes the importance of considering the “critical 
design skills” of engineers, contractors, and others who research and develop the 
weapons systems of America’s military forces for both today and tomorrow.  Other 
sections of the act require that the decision to terminate major-weapons-systems 
acquisition programs will include consideration of the effect of the program’s termination 
on the industrial base itself.  Rather than a step towards consolidation of industrial 
support, as some critics may argue, the act is a necessary and important measure to 
ensure that our competitive industrial and defense design base remains healthily engaged 
and does not atrophy.   
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. GENERAL APPROACH 
In a September 2009 study entitled The Economic Case for Investment in the UK 
Defence Industry, researchers and economists at Oxford Economics in London used a 
detailed framework for analyzing the economic contribution of various industries (Oxford 
Economics, 2009).  This thesis will apply much of the Oxford Economics’ framework as 
it analyzes the economic returns of the U.S. shipbuilding and repairing sector, as defined 
by North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) code 336611, through at 
least four lenses: 
(1) Monetary impact—using input/output analysis to analyze the direct, indirect, 
and induced channels of the shipbuilding sector on the U.S. economy. 
(2) Labor market impact—how many jobs are supported by U.S. shipbuilding; 
what are the relative skill levels of those jobs compared to average; what is the 
regional distribution of those jobs throughout the country? 
(3) Capital intensity—“sectors that invest the most in capital and labor present the 
largest potential for losses if they fail” (Oxford Economics, 2009). 
(4) Capacity measures and a rapid return?—“in order for an increase in 
Government procurement to have an immediate impact on the economy, a 
sector must have sufficient spare capacity to absorb the additional demand” 
(Oxford Economics, 2009). 
In order to best understand the methodology used by Oxford Economics, the 
researcher travelled to the group’s London Office in December 2009 to meet with the two 
economists who were mainly responsible for the study’s content—Mr. Andrew Tessler 
and Mr. Pete Collings.  Additionally, this thesis research included interviews with 
professors, shipbuilding industry leaders, and several distinguished economists both 
inside and outside of the U.S. Department of Defense.  A list of standardized interview 
questions is included in Appendix A.  In all, interviews were conducted with economists, 
professionals, and industry experts affiliated with the following organizations: 
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 Oxford Economics, London; 
 General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB), Groton, CT; 
 Naval Reactors (NAVSEA 08), Washington, DC; 
 Naval Sea Systems Command Cost Engineering and Industrial Analysis 
(NAVSEA 05C), Washington, DC; 
 Strategic Systems Programs (SSP), Arlington, VA; 
 Program Executive Office (PEO) for Submarines, Washington, DC; 
 Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA; 
 General Dynamics’ National Steel and Shipbuilding Company 
(GD/NASSCO), San Diego, CA; 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and 
Comptroller), Washington, DC; 
 Program Executive Office (PEO) for Integrated Warfare Systems, 
Washington, DC; and 
 Defense Resources Management Institute (DRMI), Monterey, CA. 
B. FREE MARKET CONCERNS 
Several months of research and interviews with various economists revealed that 
some of them have a fundamental ideological concern regarding the use of government 
spending as a means of stimulating the economy.  The idea that government spending 
creates a multiplier effect for economic benefit is based on the economic theory of John 
Maynard Keynes, and the formal concept of a multiplier was published by Richard Kahn 
in 1931 (Samuelson, 1994).  Much academic debate and theory about the multipliers 
applicability continues to permeate economic literature.  In today’s environment, a 
prominent professor of economics at Harvard University, Dr. Robert Barro, has 
conducted research demonstrating that there is “no evidence of a Keynesian multiplier 
effect” for stimulus spending, and he has published his view that “defense-spending 
multipliers exceeding one likely apply only at very high unemployment rates, and 
nondefense multipliers are probably smaller” (Redlick, 2009).  Still, prominent 
economists disagree about the beneficial effects of Keynesian government spending.  The 
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Journal of Post Keynesian Economics is a forum in which scholars can publish research 
based on the theories of Keynesian multipliers and Keynes’ ideas of stimulus. 
One distinguished economist with Stanford University’s Hoover Institute and 
others with the Naval Postgraduate School have suggested that the United States 
government could acquire ships more efficiently (at a lower cost) by allowing them to be 
produced overseas, where there may be a comparative advantage for ship construction.  
Although perhaps economically sound, national decision makers widely agree that U.S. 
national security requires maintaining the ability to build warships on American soil. 
Once agreed that the capability to produce U.S. warships on American soil is vital to U.S. 
national security interests, the benefits, or economic returns of doing so ought to be well 
known.  In the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, findings published in 2005/2006 
reveal that “a rise in defense spending had a favorable impact on GDP and employment, 
but led to larger trade and budget deficits” (Atesoglu, 2005–6).  Although there is much 
political and economic debate on the economic merits of government spending and 
investment, this research will build upon the work of credible, established Nobel-laureate 
economists8 and closely follow the methodology employed by researchers at Oxford 
Economics. 
C. MONETARY IMPACT: DIRECT, INDIRECT, INDUCED  
1. Input/Output Analysis and Leontief Inversion 
 Input/output economic analysis is a Nobel Prize-winning analytical framework 
developed by Professor Wassily Leontief in the late 1930s (Miller & Blair, 1985).  All 
economic activity within a country is divided into sectors or industries.  In the United 
States, those sectors are identified using the North American Industrial Classification 
System (NAICS) codes.9  Inter-industry transactions are then measured for a specific 
                                                 
8 Wassily Leontief received “The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred 
Nobel 1973”; Paul Krugman, who widely agrees with Keynes’ theories, received the prize in 2008 
(Krugman, 2009). 
9 NAICS is the “standard used by Federal statistical agencies in classifying business establishments for 
the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the U.S. business economy” 
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2010). 
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time period (one year) in constant monetary terms (the U.S. dollar).  The results, known 
as benchmark data, are represented in a matrix consisting of outputs listed in rows, and 
inputs listed in columns.  The format allows analysis of how one industry’s outputs are 
dependent upon inputs from all other sectors of the economy.  The United States’ Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA) last collected such economy-wide benchmark data for the 
U.S. economy in 2002; a revised version of that data was published in April 2008 (BEA, 
2008). 
Once in possession of benchmark economic data for the economy as a whole, a 
series of specific steps may be performed in order to identify a specific sector’s impact on 
the economy.  First, the flow from sector i to sector j is defined as zij.  Next, the variable 
Xj is chosen as the total gross output of the individual sector j in the given year.  From 






 The resulting coefficient then represents the dollar value of inputs from sector i 
required for every dollar of output from sector j.  The system is designed to provide 
constant returns to scale.  In other words, an ij is a fixed relationship; when output from 
sector j is doubled, it is assumed that the inputs required from sector i would also be 
doubled.  Economies of scale in production are thus ignored; the Leontief system is 
strictly a linear model.  Furthermore, the inter-industry flows from i to j for a given year 
depend entirely and exclusively on the total output of sector j for that specific year 
(Miller & Blair, 1985). 
 Rather than manually performing the matrix algebra required to analyze the 
impacts of a certain sector, a software model developed by researchers at Carnegie 
Mellon University performs a Leontief inverse on the portion of the larger matrix 
pertinent to the sector chosen.  The model, originally created in 1995, is called Economic 
Input-Output Life Cycle Assessment (EIO-LCA) and is “comprised of national economic 
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input-output models and publicly available resource use and emissions data” (Carnegie, 
n.d.).  Only the economic results will be used in this study; the environmental impact will 
not be considered.   
With a credible reputation based on the Nobel Prize-winning theory of Wassily 
Leontief and reliable data from the BEA, Carnegie Mellon University proclaims that “the 
EIO-LCA method has been applied to economic models of the United States for several 
different years, as well as Canada, Germany, Spain, and select U.S. states.  The on-line 
tool has been accessed over 1 million times by researchers, LCA practitioners, business 
users, students, and others.”  Additionally, the input/output analysis method has been 
“used extensively for planning throughout the world” (Carnegie, n.d.).  
a. Direct, Indirect, and Induced Impacts 
By considering various channels of impact, economic multipliers may be 
calculated for three distinct areas of the shipbuilding industry’s overall economic impact:  
direct effects, indirect effects, and induced effects.  Direct impacts are employment and 
activity in the sector itself—the shipbuilding industry.  Indirect impacts are defined as 
“employment and activity supported down the supply chain, as a result of a sector’s 
companies purchasing goods and services from” suppliers (Oxford Economics, 2009, p. 
14).  For example, when a shipyard is building a new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), it may 
order a fire-control system to be installed that was designed in California.  That same 
system may have been built with components from Washington state.  The purchase of 
various equipment and supplies from vendors, as well as jobs and sales at those vendors’ 
offices, may be quantified as indirect impacts for investment in the shipbuilding industry.  
Finally, induced impacts are of pivotal economic importance to the study of ship 
construction.  Oxford Economics defines induced impacts as “employment and activity 
supported by the consumer spending of those employed in the sector or in its supply 
chain” (2009, p. 14).  For instance, the manufacturer of a component ordered by the 
shipyard for construction of a new vessel has additional revenue from the sale of that 
component; that revenue is spent in his local economy buying everyday goods and 
services, which benefits local economic growth.  The BEA states that induced 
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multipliers, which “include the economic impact of industries and household 
expenditures […] are […] the most commonly used” (1997, p. 23).  Induced analysis 
considers a wide variety of industries and activities throughout the United States and 
relies on creation of an economic multiplier for its quantification.   
2. Other Sectors Considered 
 The “shipbuilding and repairing” sector will henceforth be referred to simply as 
the “shipbuilding” industry.  Per NAICS labeling, shipbuilding is a sub-sector of the 
(336xxx) group labeled “vehicles and other transportation equipment.”    Comparisons of 
Leontief model output will be analyzed and contrasted with five other sectors of the U.S. 
economy: 
 Automobile manufacturing (336111), 
 Aircraft manufacturing (336411), 
 Military-armored-vehicles and tank-parts manufacturing (336992), 
 Nonresidential manufacturing structures (230102), and 
 Health care: offices of physicians, dentists, health care practitioners 
(621A00). 
These five sectors were chosen by the sponsor to include three other subcategories of 
manufacturing transportation vehicles, a more general manufacturing alternative, and also 
a service-based industry for comparison. 
3. Estimation of Induced Multipliers 
 In addition to the direct and indirect economic effects to be calculated using the 
Carnegie Mellon model, induced effects should also be considered and quantified.  The 
induced impacts of activity within a sector are “employment and activity supported by 
the consumer spending of those employed in the sector or in its supply chain.  This helps 
to support jobs in [U.S.] industries that supply these purchases and includes jobs in retail 
outlets, companies producing consumer goods and in a range of service industries” 
(Oxford Economics, 2009).  Since the induced effects are the most difficult to quantify, 
data from previous studies of U.S. and U.K. shipbuilding industries will be reviewed.  
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Based on the recommendation of economist Andrew Tesller at Oxford Economics 
(www.oef.com), the induced multiplier for U.S. shipbuilding will be estimated as a 
fraction of the indirect multiplier.  Induced multipliers may be calculated from 
direct/indirect multipliers by estimating the household consumption multiplier and 
making some general assumptions (Katz, 1980). 
4. Regional Distribution of Impacts and Employment 
Based on the work of Garnick and Drake in the 1970s, the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) has published a handbook for users of its Regional Input-Output 
Multipliers System (LECG, 2002).10  The process of using the BEA’s system to derive 
regional multipliers is summarized concisely in the 2002 LECG report for the American 
Shipbuilders Council: 
The RIMS II method for estimating regional Input-Output multipliers can 
be viewed as a three-step process.  In the first step, the producer portion of 
the national Input-Output table is made region-specific by using four-digit 
SIC location quotients (LQ's). The LQ's estimate the extent to which input 
requirements are supplied by firms within the region. RIMS II uses LQ's 
based on two types of data: BEA's personal income data (by place of 
residence) are used to calculate LQ's in the service industries; and BEA's 
wage-and-salary data (by place of work) are used to calculate LQ's in the 
nonservice industries.  
In the second step, the household row and the household column from the 
national Input-Output table are made region-specific. The household row 
coefficients, which are derived from the value-added row of the national 
Input-Output table, are adjusted to reflect regional earnings leakages 
resulting from individuals working in the region but residing outside the 
region. The household column coefficients, which are based on the 
personal consumption expenditure column of the national Input-Output 
table, are adjusted to account for regional consumption leakages stemming 
from personal taxes and savings. 
 
                                                 
10 Regional Input-Output Multipliers System (RIMS II) is explained in Appendix C of the 2002 LECG 
report. 
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In the last step, the Leontief inversion approach is used to estimate 
multipliers. This inversion approach produces output, earnings, and 
employment multipliers, which can be used to trace the impacts of 
changes in final demand on directly and indirectly affected industries.  (p. 
C-9) 
Rather than manually performing the matrix algebra and Leontief inversion, the 
results of the Carnegie Mellon Economic Input-Output Life Cycle Assessment model will 
once again be utilized.  RIMS II models will also be obtained from the BEA so that 
employment and multiplier data will be available from at least two sources: Carnegie 
Mellon’s model and the RIMS II model. 
D. ABOR MARKET IMPACT 
1. Highly Skilled Jobs 
Many of the workers involved in ship construction and modernization have been 
training for years to earn the specific qualifications necessary to perform those tasks.  To 
be a nuclear plant welder in the United States, for example, “one must be cleared by the 
FBI, undergo drug and alcohol testing, and pass a psychological screening. These criteria 
are above and beyond welding certification, diving certification, and special training 
required of all nuclear plant personnel” (Hancock, 2003).  The nuclear welders and 
construction personnel who build our aircraft carriers and submarines are not an 
immediately renewable resource.  In other words, if they are eliminated from the 
workforce due to drastic drops in demand for their services at the “big six” shipyards, 
then there are at least two formidable and unfavorable results.  First, if the U.S. military 
suddenly has an increased demand for specialized labor in nuclear or conventional ship 
construction (war), then we will not have that capacity available to be utilized.  We may 
have to actually outsource those jobs to other countries, which is particularly dangerous 
and difficult in terms of national security and weapons systems construction.  Secondly, 
the atrophy of the workers’ skills in industry combined with the graying of the workforce 
may actually lead to a regression of the “knowledge economy” of this sector of the U.S. 
defense and shipbuilding industries, leading to a larger-scale contraction (RAND, 2006).  
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The principle of a knowledge economy is, in brevity, an explanation of the use of 
knowledge itself as a product or tool producing an economic benefit (Drucker, 1992).  
For instance, the training, experience, and skill level of an individual welder or shipyard 
worker has some inherent economic value, which can be quantified in calculating the sum 
of the industry or activity’s economic worth. 
2. Labor Trends 
Data collected from Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) shows labor force 
levels at the nation’s six private shipyards since 1985.  The data has been tabulated, 
presented, and correlated with a specific case of demand for one shipyard. 
E. CAPITAL INTENSITY, AND EXCESS CAPACITY—“WHAT IF”? 
In researching the unique aspects of the U.S. shipbuilding industry as it compares 
to other defense activities, Dr. Nayantara Hensel, a former professor at the Naval 
Postgraduate School and current Chief Economist in the Assistant Secretary of the Navy 
(Financial Management & Comptroller Office), highlighted the high capital intensity and 
sunk investments of infrastructure existing within the shipbuilding sector.   
The facilities and infrastructure themselves become economic “waste” if the 
existing capacity is not utilized by providing an appropriate demand signal (Hensel, 
2009).  The same principle is summarized nicely in the Oxford Economics report on 
investment in the U.K. defense industry: “sectors that invest the most in capital and 
labour present the largest potential for losses, if they fail” (p. 26).  In summary, unlike 
shopping malls and retail centers, shipyards (as they are both highly capital and labor 
intensive) are unable to be readily converted to some other economic activity, if they fail.  
Rather, they become “waste.”  There is, therefore, an inherent opportunity cost of failing 
to utilize the existing capacity—the current market values of the facilities and technology 
themselves.  Acceptance of this principle that irrevocable waste results from failure to 
utilize sectors with high capital intensity, combined with the clear evidence of the 
shipbuilding industry’s investment in capital plants and equipment, supports the claim 
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that basic funding levels to sustain the industry’s existence at current levels is 
economically viable and preferable (Booth, Colomb & Williams, 2008).   
Using public data from the released “10k” financial statements of various 






This ratio provides “a measure of a firm’s efficiency in deployment of its assets, 
computed as a ratio of the total value of assets to sales revenue generated over a given 
period.  Capital intensity indicates how much money is invested to produce one dollar of 
sales revenue” (BusinessDictionary.com, n.d.).  Moreover, “a decline in a capital 
intensive industry may mean a permanent loss of productive capacity” (Oxford 
Economics, 2009). 
 The reciprocal of “capital intensity” as defined above, is a ratio known as Total 
Assets Turnover Ratio (TATR).  The ratio measures the ability of a company (or business 
group within a company) to use its assets to generate sales.  Expressed as “number of 
turns,” the higher the TATR, the more efficiently a group is using its assets in order to 
generate sales revenue. 
 Data has been isolated from General Dynamic’s 2009 published annual report.  
Specifically, from General Dynamics Marine Systems division, which “designs, builds 
and supports submarines and a variety of surface ships for the U.S. Navy and commercial 
customers.  Among the sophisticated platforms the group delivers are nuclear-powered 
attack submarines, surface combatants, auxiliary and combat-logistics ships, and 
commercial product carriers. The group also provides world-class engineering design 
support and overhaul, repair and lifecycle support” (General Dynamics, 2009).  Both 
ratios will consider all current and noncurrent assets, including fixed assets, such as 
plants and equipment, as well as inventory, accounts receivable, and cash. 
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In addition, published financial statements from corporate leaders representing the 
five sectors contrasted with shipbuilding will each be analyzed using the same measure of 
capital intensity: 
 Automobile manufacturing—Ford Motor Company, Toyota 
 Aircraft manufacturing—Boeing, General Dynamics Aerospace 
 Military Armored Vehicles and tank parts manufacturing—GD Combat 
Systems 
 Health care—Bayer  
F. CAPACITY MEASURES AND A RAPID RETURN?  
In order for an increase in Government procurement to have an 
immediate impact on the economy, a sector must have sufficient spare 
capacity to absorb the additional demand  
—Oxford Economics, 2009 
Data regarding the capacity and capacity utilization of the shipbuilding sector has 
been collected from the Federal Reserve Board.  The United States Federal Reserve 
Board regularly constructs estimates of capacity and capacity utilization for industries in 
manufacturing, mining, electric, and gas utilities.  For a given industry, the capacity 
utilization rate is equal to an output index (seasonally adjusted) divided by a capacity 
index.  The Federal Reserve Board’s capacity indices “attempt to capture the concept of 
sustainable maximum output—the greatest level of output a plant can maintain within the 
framework of a realistic work schedule, after factoring in normal downtime and assuming 
sufficient availability of inputs to operate the capital in place”(Federal Reserve Board, 
2009).  The details of the six-step procedure used by the Federal Reserve to calculate 
capacity utilization are included in Appendix B. 
The available macroeconomic data from the Federal Reserve were analyzed for 
trends in capacity utilization and compared to the median capacity-utilization rate for the 
fourth quarter of 2009 for the manufacturing sectors. 
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IV. RESULTS 
A. INPUT/OUPUT MULTIPLIER ANALYSIS 
Carnegie Mellon University’s Economic Input-Output Life Cycle Assessment 
(EIO-LCA) model was used to perform a Leontief inverse solution based on U.S. 
Benchmark data with the following results.  First, it should be noted that the latest United 
States benchmark data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis is data from 2002 that was 
last updated in 2008.  The model’s software calculates a coefficients matrix based on the 
input-output data for the U.S. economy.  By isolating a single sector of the economy, and 
choosing a given level of output or production from that sector, direct and indirect 
economic activity estimates are generated.  The shipbuilding and repairing sector 
(NAICS code 336611) was selected for analysis, with an increased production from that 
sector of $1 billion.  In other words, an injection of $1 billion was entered into the model 
in the form of additional, final demand from the shipbuilding sector.   
One possible source of an additional ship production demand of $1 billion would 
be government orders for U.S. Navy vessels.  However, this particular model makes no 
distinction between military and civilian contracts, nor between Navy and commercial 
shipbuilding.  If the private market were to demand an additional $1 billion in 
commercial ship construction, then the economic activity estimates would be the same as 
those created from Navy demand.  Since the Leontief function is a linear model, output 
results will vary proportionally with those generated in Table 1.  For instance, entering  
$2 billion increased output demand into the model will yield results that are double those 








Table 1.   Total and Direct Economic Effects of $1 Billion Output 









($ mil)   
 Total for all sectors 2,090 1,570 
336611 Shipbuilding and repairing 999 999 
420000 Wholesale trade 67.0 36.1 
550000 Management of companies and enterprises 64.8 33.8 
333618 Other engine equipment manufacturing 55.7 49.3 
331110 Iron and steel mills 32.8 16.8 
533000 Lessors of nonfinancial intangible assets 31.3 23.5 
541610 Management consulting services 25.0 17.8 
52A000 
Monetary authorities and depository credit 
intermediation 
24.2 11.6 
523000 Securities, commodity contracts, investments 21.8 13.3 
531000 Real estate 21.5 4.07 
 
1. Direct Economic Effects 
In the first row of Table 1, labeled “total for all sectors,” direct economic effects 
of $1.57 billion represent the dollar amounts of purchases made by the shipbuilding and 
repairing sector in order to manufacture its final product (a ship).  This $1.57 billion 
includes the produced value of $1 billion increased economic activity for the shipbuilding 
and repairing sector, which is shown (minus rounding error of 1) in the second row of 
Table 1.  So, the sector purchases $570 million worth of products (goods and services) 
from other sectors in order to make $1 billion worth of output.   
The shipbuilding and repair sector ranks fourth of the six sectors considered, 
when ranked by direct economic effects, as shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   Direct Economic Impact of an Additional $1 Billion Output by Sector 
Sector # Sector Description 
Direct Economic Impact  
($ billion) 
336111 automobile manufacturing $1,740 
336411 aircraft manufacturing $1,650 
336992 
military armored vehicles & tank parts 
manufacturing $1,600 





offices of physicians, dentists, health 
care practitioners $1,350 
 
2. Value Added 
The difference between the $1 billion output from shipbuilding and the 
$570 million of inputs it requires is the value added by the shipbuilding and repairing 
sector itself.  The value added amount represents “compensation of employees, taxes on 
production and imports less subsidies, and gross operating surplus.  Value added equals 
the difference between an industry’s gross output ($1 billion) minus the cost of its 
intermediate goods that are purchased (such as energy & raw materials)” (Carnegie, n.p.).  
For instance, once the raw materials and services are purchased from other sectors, the 
value of the skilled labor and contribution from the shipyards themselves totals 
$430 million.  Stated differently, the $430 million in value added is one (direct) 
component of an increase in GDP as a result of the additional $1 billion of output. 
Table 3 and Figure 2 show the value added (contribution to GDP) by sector to the 
U.S. economy for a $1 billion increased output from that sector.  The shipbuilding sector 





Table 3.   Purchases and Value Added Amounts for Various Sectors, With $1 Billion Increased Production 












336111 automobile manufacturing $1,000 $740 $260 
336411 aircraft manufacturing $1,000 $650 $350 
336992 
military armored vehicles & tank 
parts manufacturing $1,000 600 $400 
336611 shipbuilding and repairing $1,000 $570 $430 
230102 
Nonresidential manufacturing 
structures $1,000 $410 $590 
621A00 
offices of physicians, dentists, 




Figure 2.   Economic “Value Added” for $1 Billion Increase in Demand From Sectors 
 
Shipbuilding and repairing is a sector that is nearly split between the two main 
factors of production needed to generate additional output—materials and labor 
(purchases and value added).  Whereas automobile and aircraft manufacturing are ranked 
number one and number two, respectively, in terms of direct economic effects, this 
ranking reflects a high degree of automation in their manufacturing processes.  Most of 
the direct activity generated is due to purchases of materials these industries must make 
in order to manufacture their finished goods. 
 When the results are analyzed in terms of value added by the industry itself, the 
ranking of the six sectors considered is nearly inverted.  In other words, “offices of 
physicians, dentists, and health care practitioners” (health care services), which were first 
when ranked by value added, were last in total direct effects.  Shipbuilding remains in the 
middle of the group when ranked by value added, since, as a sector, it requires about 57% 
of materials ($570 million/$1,000 million), and 43% labor as components of the 
additional $1 billion output.  One may conclude that shipbuilding represents a “healthy 
balance” between these two contributing factors of production, providing stimulation of 
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the economy through both purchases of materials and wages to workers.  The data reflect 
that shipbuilding is both capital and labor intensive, presenting two avenues for economic 
stimulus. 
3. Total Economic Effects 
 For shipbuilding and repair, a total economic impact of $2.09 billion, as presented 
in the first row of Table 1, represents the total purchases by all sectors of the economy 
resulting from an additional $1 billion output from shipbuilding and repairing.  The $2.09 
billion includes the direct purchases made by the shipbuilding and repair sector itself, and 
also the indirect purchases further up the supply chain—the materials and services needed 
to produce the goods sold to the shipbuilding and repairing sector.  Included within the 
$2.09 billion of activity is the $1 billion of increased final output from shipbuilding.  
Figure 3 shows how the total $2.09 billion is divided. 
 
Figure 3.   Sources of Total Economic Activity Generated by Shipbuilding 
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Figure 4 shows a graphical representation of the total and direct economic effects 
generated by an additional $1 billion output from six different sectors of the U.S. 
economy.   
 
Figure 4.   Economic Effects of Additional $1 Billion of Output from Sectors 
 
The shipbuilding sector ranks fourth out of the six sectors considered, when 
ranked by total economic effects, with a multiplier of 2.09 ($2,090 million/$1,000 
million).  Regional economic multipliers for each of the “big six” shipyards may actually 
be much higher, as suggested by the results of the BEA’s Regional Input-Output 
Modeling System (RIMS) results presented in Table 9 and described below. 
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4. Induced Economic Effects 
Since $2.09 billion of total economic activity occurs for every $1 billion increased 
output from shipbuilding, the output multiplier, when considering only the impacts within 
the sector (direct) and the supply chain (indirect), is 2.09.  Economists refer to this as a 
“Type I multiplier” (Tessler & Collings, 2009).  For every $1 of increased output from 
shipbuilding, about $2.09 of direct and indirect activity occurs.  
An additional impact in this analysis is the induced effects from the $2.09 billion 
of activity throughout the economy.  The induced impacts are “employment and activity 
supported by the consumer spending of those employed in the sector or in its supply 
chain.  This helps to support jobs in [U.S.] industries that supply these purchases and 
includes jobs in retail outlets, companies producing consumer goods and in a range of 
service industries” (Oxford Economics, 2009).  The induced multiplier is the most 
difficult to calculate or estimate, and the least defendable for any industry or sector.  
Economists call multipliers that include induced effects “Type II multipliers” (Tessler & 
Collings, 2009).  The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis describes Type II multipliers as 
a “measure [of] the economic impact of industries and household expenditures. These 
multipliers include the impacts associated with the spending of earnings by labor within 
the region. Therefore, endogenous multipliers can be used to estimate the sum of direct, 
indirect, and induced impacts. These are the most commonly used multipliers” (BEA, 
1997). 
Since the Carnegie Mellon software does not include induced effects in 
generating the economic activity results, a Type II multiplier is not explicitly calculated 
using the Leontief inversion process within that model.  However, the constant that 
relates the “Type I and Type II multipliers in an input-output model [has been] proven to 
be exactly the consumption multiplier for the household sector” (Katz, 1980).  The basic 
consumption multiplier is based on the Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) and the 










An average tax rate of 29% was used, including federal income tax, social 
security, medicare, and possible state taxes (Steuerle, 2004).  Assuming a national, 
average marginal propensity to save (savings rate) of 5%, then MPC =  1 – MPS = 95% 
(OMB, 2010).  The result shows as follows: 
 




The result of using this consumption-multiplier estimate to produce Type II multipliers is 




Table 4.   Calculation of Type II Multipliers for Various Sectors 













336111 automobile manufacturing 2.71 1 3.07 5.25 
336411 aircraft manufacturing 2.33 1 3.07 4.08 
336992 
Military armored vehicles & tank 
parts manufacturing 2.2 1 3.07 3.68 
336611 shipbuilding and repairing 2.09 1 3.07 3.35 
230102 
nonresidential manufacturing 
structures 1.8 1 3.07 2.46 
621A00 
offices of physicians, dentists, 
health care practitioners 1.6 1 3.07 1.84 
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 In reality, differences exist in consumption multipliers between various sectors, 
but a realistic range is between 3.0 and 3.5, based on tax rates varying by region and 
MPC varying by profession or trade. 
 An alternative means of calculating Type II multipliers was conducted using the 
Regional Input-Output Modeling System (RIMS II) through the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.  The results from this method are presented by specific state—
showing 51 various output multipliers (including the District of Columbia), accounting 
for the induced factor of consumers’ spending wages.  The resulting output from the 
RIMS model is presented in Table 9. 
5. Multipliers: The “Bottom Line” for the Navy SCN Account 
Applying the induced multiplier, as calculated, to the Navy’s expenditures on ship 
construction, allow an estimate of that account’s economic impact on the U.S. economy.  
The FY2010 budget included $13.8 billion ($13,776,867,000) for the “Shipbuilding and 
Conversion, Navy,” or SCN account (DoN, 2009).  Starting at that $13.8 billion level, 
Table 5 shows the estimate of total economic impact to the U.S. economy.  At current 
funding, the Navy’s SCN account provides about $46.2 billion of economic activity 
nationwide. 
With an increase of $2 billion to the SCN account, and applying a calculated Type 
II multiplier of 3.35, the economic activity generated will be approximately $52.9 billion 
nationwide.  For the purposes of generating Tables 5 and 6, an increase in SCN funding is 
assumed to be equal to an increase in final demand output from the shipbuilding and 









Table 5.   Impact of Various SCN Funding Levels on U.S. Economy 
(Using Type II Multipliers) 
Increase in SCN 
Funding           
($ billion) 
Total SCN Budget Level     
($ billion) 
Total Economic 
Impact ($ billion) 
0 $13.8 $46.2 
$0.1 $13.9 $46.6 
$1 $14.8 $49.6 
$2 $15.8 $52.9 
$5 $18.8 $63.0 
$6 $19.8 $66.3 
$7 $20.8 $69.7 
$8 $21.8 $73.0 
$9 $22.8 $76.4 
$10 $23.8 $79.7 
 
When considering the effect on U.S. Gross Domestic Product of potential changes to the 
Navy’s SCN funding, one must isolate the “value added” portion of the economic activity 
generated.  Carnegie Mellon’s Green Design Institute explains the value added definition 
in its handbook for users of the EIO-LCA model: 
The value added represents compensation of employees, taxes on 
production and imports less subsides, and gross operating surplus.  Value 
added equals the difference between an industry's gross output (income, 
taxes, and inventory change) and the cost of its intermediate inputs 
(energy, raw materials, semi-finished goods, and services that are 
purchased).  Another way to think about Value Added is that once the 
[shipbuilding and repairing] sector purchases all the materials that it needs 
to make its product, it is still just a pile of parts and services.  The amount 
paid to workers, the taxes, etc., also contribute to the economy and create 
a useful product that has additional value to a consumer beyond the 
original pile of parts and services. (2008, n.p.)   
The Carnegie Mellon University model shows that about $430 million of “value 
added” is created for an increase in final demand of $1 billion.  Since all Leontief models 






Table 6.   Effect on U.S. GDP for Various SCN Funding Levels  






Total SCN Budget Level   
($ billion) 
Total SCN Account 
Contribution to GDP 
(Value Added) 
($ million) 
(from FY10 level) 
( delta - value 
added) 
(based on $13.8B for 
FY2010) 
($43 mil per $100 
mil) 
0 $0 $13.8 $5,934
$0.1 $43 $13.9 $5,977
$1 $430 $14.8 $6,364
$2 $860 $15.8 $6,794
$5 $2,150 $18.8 $8,084
$6 $2,580 $19.8 $8,514
$7 $3,010 $20.8 $8,944
$8 $3,440 $21.8 $9,374
$9 $3,870 $22.8 $9,804
$10 $4,300 $23.8 $10,234
 
The United Kingdom Office of National Statistics states that Gross Value Added 
(GVA) is “used in the estimation of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).” Furthermore, the 
“production approach to estimating GDP looks at the contribution of each economic unit 
by estimating the value of an output (goods or services) less the value of inputs used in 
that output's production process” (UK Office of National Statistics, 2002).   In this 
research, analysis of U.S. benchmark I/O tables suggests that the shipbuilding industry 
requires $570 million of purchases or inputs in order to produce $1 billion worth of 
output (ships).  Therefore, the data show that raising the Navy’s funding for shipbuilding 
and repair by $1 billion will also boost U.S. GDP by an additional $430 million.  
Additionally, current SCN funding of $13.8 billion (FY2010) generates about $5.9 billion 
of Gross Domestic Product for the U.S. economy.   
B. LABOR MARKET IMPACT 
1. Using the Carnegie Mellon EIO-LCA Model 
Using the Carnegie Mellon EIO-LCA model, the numbers in Table 7 represent the 
complete number of employees needed across the supply chain of purchases in order to 
produce the level of output of $1 billion.   
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Table 7.   Number of Employees Needed to Generate $1 Billion of Output in Six Sectors 
Sector # Sector # of Employees 
336611 shipbuilding and repairing 16,700
336992 military armored vehicles & tank parts manufacturing 15,300
336411 aircraft manufacturing 14,300
336111 automobile manufacturing 13,800
621A00 offices of physicians, dentists, health care practitioners 13,800
230102 nonresidential manufacturing structures 11,200
 
The U.S. economy-wide benchmark data used for this section is the 1997 
benchmark data, since the 2002 EIO-LCA model did not include the labor output 
functionality.  Here, the shipbuilding and repair sector ranks first out of the six 
considered, with 16,700 additional employees needed throughout the supply chain in 
order to increase shipbuilding output by $1 billion.  The model used is a linear model, so 
an increased output of $100 million would require 1,670 employees.  The next most 
labor-intensive sector of the six considered is military armored vehicles manufacturing, 
which would utilize 15,300 additional employees.  In other words, of the six specific 
sectors considered here for possible investments of federal government dollars (to 
increase that sector’s output), shipbuilding and repairing will create or support the highest 




Figure 5.   Number of Employees to Produce $1 Billion of Output 
 
Of the 16,700 jobs created or supported by the shipbuilding and repairing sector 
in order to create an additional $1 billion of output, the EIO-LCA model suggests that 
9,180 of those jobs would be within the shipbuilding sector itself, while the remaining 
7,520 would be throughout the supply chain (part of the indirect benefit).  In addition, 
Figure 6 shows the estimated distribution of the direct and indirect labor throughout the 
country.  The graphical results are presented as a percentage of total sector employment 
(direct and indirect) employed.  The states that include the nation’s “big 6” private 





Figure 6.   Nationwide Distribution of Labor for the Shipbuilding Industry 
(Carnegie Mellon, 2008) 
 
Several assumptions and limitations are associated with the use of the EIO-LCA 
model to estimate increased employment based on a larger output demand.  First, the data 
is old (1997 benchmark).  However, the industries selected are mature industries.  Use of 
the model for information technology or telecommunications estimates would be much 
less reliable because these sectors have experienced more widespread growth than 
shipbuilding, auto/aircraft manufacturing, or health care services.  Secondly, the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis compiles benchmark data through surveys and forms submitted by 
U.S. corporations to the federal government.  Uncertainty in sampling, response rate, and 
errors in form completion are just a few of the potential sources of discrepancy between 
the data input and reality. 
In addition, the EIO-LCA is a producer price model—“the price a producer 
receives for goods and services (plus taxes, minus subsidies), or the cost of buying all the 
materials, running facilities, paying workers, etc.” (Carnegie, 2008, n.p.).  The alternative 
pricing method, “purchaser price,” would include the producer price plus the 
transportation costs of shipping the product to the point of sale and the wholesale and 
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retail trade margins (the profit these industries take for marketing and selling the 
product).  For many goods, the producer prices can be far less than what a final consumer 
would pay (e.g., the producer price for leather goods in the U.S. is approximately 35% of 
the final purchaser price) (Carnegie, 2008, n.p.). 
2. Shipyard Direct Labor Trends 
The Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA 05C) provided data for the 
employment of workers at six U.S. private shipyards for the past several decades.  The 
data are presented in Table 8 and Figure 7, which shows variation in the labor force 
levels at the “big 6” shipyards.  The six shipyards are all owned by one of just two 
companies—Northrop Grumman (NG) or General Dynamics (GD).  As of the beginning 
of 2009, these shipyards employed over 56,000 workers in 7 states: 
 Northrop Grumman—VA 
 Northrop Grumman—MS 
 Northrop Grumman—LA 
 General Dynamics Electric Boat—RI & CT 
 General Dynamics Bath Iron Works—ME  














Table 8.   Shipyard Employment as of January 1 
  1985 1990 1995 2000 2005  2009
(NG) Newport News  28,502 25,517 19,878 16,971 18,769  18,720
(NG) Ingalls  10,805 11,516 13,952 10,500 12,470  11,385
(NG) Avondale  4,656 7,013 5,904 7,581 7,631  5,486
(GD) Electric Boat  24,797 21,572 15,347 8,646 11,775  10,546
(GD) Bath Iron Works  7,534 11,494 9,125 7,516 5,918  5,439
(GD) NASSCO  4,055 3,236 4,076 2,695 4,213  4,772
TOTAL  80,349 80,348 68,282 53,909 60,776  56,348
 
As seen in Table 8, individual shipyard workforce levels varied from 1985 to 
2009.  Ingalls, Avondale, and NASSCO were relatively stable, but Electric Boat and 
Newport News suffered significant workforce losses.  These losses may be correlated to 
declines in demand.  For instance, only one U.S. submarine was constructed11 from 1998 
to 2003, when Electric Boat’s workforce levels reached its lowest point in several 
decades (Doehring & Jenning, 2009). 
Twenty years ago, in January 1990, over 80,000 workers were employed.  In 
2000, shipyard labor force levels were even lower than today, reaching about 67% of the 
1990 levels.  Today, 70% of the 1990 employment levels are working throughout the six 
shipyards represented in Figure 7. 
 
                                                 
11 Identified by Commissioning Data (http://www.gdeb.com/programs/ and 
http://www.navysite.de/submarine.htm).  USS Connecticut was commissioned December 11, 1998. 
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Figure 7.   U.S. Shipyard Labor Trends (After NAVSEA 05C data file, last updated for all 
shipyards in January 2009) 
 
Figure 8 was produced by NAVSEA 05C’s Portfolio Assessment Team and 
shows the contribution to state GDP per shipyard worker compared to the average worker 
in the state.  The results show that in Maine, where Bath Iron Works employs over 5,400 
workers, shipyard workers contribute, on average, more than nine times the income of an 
average Maine worker.12 
 
 
                                                 
12 The source of average state-wage data is the respective state’s Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 46




































Figure 8.   Shipyard Worker and Average Worker Contribution to State GDP (From 
NAVSEA 05C Portfolio Assessment Team Economic Impact Study; Wright & 
Fields, 2009) 
 
The results of the NAVSEA team’s study suggest that shipyard workers contribute 
between six to nine times more, on average, per employee, than the average state worker. 
3. RIMS Model’s Employment Multipliers by State 
Table 9 shows the result of the BEA’s RIMS model for the U.S. shipbuilding 
industry, listed by state.  Each entry in the first column, Type I output multiplier, shows 
the “total dollar change in output that occurs in all industries for each additional dollar of 
output delivered to final demand by the [shipbuilding and repairing] industry” (BEA, 
1997).  The RIMS multipliers were generated using 1997 benchmark data and 2006 
regional data, which may explain the slight discrepancy from the Carnegie Mellon model.  
The calculated arithmetic mean of Type I output multipliers in states (only those states 
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whose output multiplier is greater than one) is 2.099, which is remarkably similar to the 
Carnegie-Mellon “total economic activity” multiplier of 2.09. 
 The second column shows the “total dollar change in earnings of households 
employed by all industries for each additional dollar of output delivered to final demand” 
by the shipbuilding industry (RIMS, 1997).  This earnings data show the link between the 
direct and indirect multiplier of column 1 and the Type II multipliers in column 3.  When 
considering the additional earnings generated, the total (output + earnings) Type II 
multiplier is presented in column 3.  Since the BEA explicitly states that the RIMS II 
model cannot be used to predict nationwide impacts, the Carnegie Mellon model’s output 
and consumption multiplier conversion was used to estimate induced effects. 
The RIMS-generated multipliers are only valid within the defined regions (states, 
in this case).  They cannot be used to approximate nationwide economic impact, but they 
are pertinent for determining which states and regions would most benefit from an 
increased investment in shipbuilding.  In addition, RIMS multipliers have been found to 
be quite accurate:  
Empirical tests indicate that RIMS II yields multipliers that are not 
substantially different in magnitude from those generated by regional I-O 
models based on relatively expensive surveys. For example, a comparison 
of 224 industry-specific multipliers from survey-based tables for Texas, 
Washington, and West Virginia indicates that RIMS II average multipliers 
overstate the average multipliers from the survey-based tables by 
approximately 5 percent. For the majority of individual industry-specific 
multipliers, the difference between RIMS II and survey-based multipliers 
is less than 10 percent. (Lynch, 2000) 
 The employment data presented in the fourth column represent the “total change 
in number of jobs that occurs in all industries for each additional 1 million dollars of 
output delivered to final demand by the industry” (BEA, 1997).  For instance, if an 
increased final demand from the nation’s shipbuilding industry was $1 billion, and  
$10 million of that demand included supply-chain purchases from the state of Illinois, 
then this activity would generate over 160 new jobs within that one state. 
 In the final column, the value-added multiplier shows the “total dollar change in 
value added that occurs in all industries for each additional dollar of output delivered to 
final demand.” 
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Illinois  2.60  0.74 3.34 16.18  1.32
Pennsylvania  2.54  0.72 3.26 15.34  1.28
Ohio  2.50  0.73 3.23 17.37  1.26
Texas  2.43  0.73 3.16 16.13  1.25
Tennessee  2.37  0.69 3.07 16.34  1.20
Michigan  2.36  0.72 3.09 16.59  1.20
California  2.33  0.72 3.05 14.67  1.21
Wisconsin  2.31  0.69 3.00 16.87  1.16
Indiana  2.31  0.67 2.97 15.26  1.15
North Carolina  2.30  0.69 2.99 17.17  1.17
Minnesota  2.28  0.68 2.96 17.14  1.17
South Carolina  2.26  0.66 2.92 15.67  1.13
Georgia  2.26  0.68 2.93 17.01  1.17
Missouri  2.25  0.63 2.88 16.02  1.15
Kentucky  2.25  0.63 2.88 16.86  1.11
Alabama  2.23  0.67 2.90 15.73  1.12
New Jersey  2.18  0.61 2.78 11.14  1.12
Massachusetts  2.12  0.62 2.74 12.34  1.10
Oregon  2.08  0.59 2.67 12.64  1.07
Connecticut  2.07  0.61 2.68 10.83  1.06
Virginia  2.06  0.60 2.66 12.58  1.05
Washington  2.04  0.64 2.68 12.52  1.06
Arkansas  2.02  0.61 2.63 16.57  1.01
Mississippi  1.95  0.56 2.51 13.51  0.96
Maryland  1.94  0.55 2.49 11.63  1.00
Louisiana  1.94  0.59 2.52 14.03  0.99
New York  1.93  0.57 2.50 10.29  1.00
Florida  1.90  0.61 2.51 13.58  1.00
Rhode Island  1.87  0.49 2.36 10.63  0.96
Maine  1.84  0.56 2.39 12.88  0.94
Idaho  1.82  0.57 2.39 12.40  0.94
Hawaii  1.73  0.56 2.29 12.34  0.90
Delaware  1.68  0.40 2.08 7.26  0.85
Alaska  1.60  0.50 2.10 12.20  0.82
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DC  1.14  0.03 1.18 0.53  0.54
Arizona  1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00
Colorado  1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00
Iowa  1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00
Kansas  1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00
Montana  1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00
Nebraska  1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00
Nevada  1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00
New 
Hampshire  1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00
New Mexico  1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00
North Dakota  1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00
Oklahoma  1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00
South Dakota  1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00
Utah  1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00
Vermont  1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00
West Virginia  1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00
Wyoming  1.00  0.00 1.00 0.00  0.00
 
C. CAPITAL INTENSITY 
Data collected from the 2009 annual reports of the companies listed in Table 10 






According to Oxford Economics (2009), “any decline in a capital intensive industry may 
mean a permanent loss of productive capacity for the [U.S.] economy.”  Prior to 
collecting the data, the expectation was that shipbuilding would be found to “stand out” 
as one of the most highly capital intensive.  Ostensibly, several millions of dollars of 
property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) are required to operate a shipyard, with a 
considerable amount of land also necessary.  These assets would be recorded on the 
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balance sheet and included in the numerator of the equation to calculate capital intensity.  
However, the balance sheet data collected show that the two shipbuilding groups, General 
Dynamics Marine Systems and Northrop Grumman’s Shipbuilding, actually are the two 
lowest capital intensities, calculated at 38.4% and 72%, respectively.  However, two 
important observations must be highlighted from the data.  First, the PP&E included in 
the reported total assets are recorded at current (depreciated) value.  Since many of the 
nation’s private shipyards have been operating for several decades, it is reasonable to 
assume that several long-lived assets are mostly or fully depreciated.  For instance, the 
NASSCO shipyard in California, now owned by General Dynamics Marine Systems, has 
been in operation since 1959.  In Connecticut, General Dynamics now owns and operates 
Electric Boat, which has been in existence since the beginnings of submarine 
construction in 1899.  Much of Electric Boat’s key infrastructure, clearly valuable capital 
today to the shipbuilding industry, is likely fully depreciated.  Thus, it would be reported 
on the balance sheet as an asset valued at zero.  One solution to this issue of asset 
valuation would be to collect historical cost data.  If all assets for the companies in Table 
10 could be valued at original, inflation-adjusted historical cost, then the comparisons of 
capital intensity ratios would be more valid and meaningful. 
 Secondly, the low capital-intensity ratios for the shipbuilding business shown in 
Table 10 necessarily reflect a high Total Assets Turnover Ratio (TATR), since TATR is 
the reciprocal of capital intensity, as defined here.  Companies with a higher TATR are 
using their existing assets to generate revenue more efficiently.  Here, General Dynamics 
Marine Systems TATR of 2.61 turns indicates that for every $1 of asset value on the 
books at the end of 2009, the business group generated $2.61 of revenue during the 2009 
fiscal year.  This high ratio stands out amongst those reported in Table 10 and supports 




















Shipbuilding          
  General Dynamics Marine Systems  2,441  6,363  38.4%  2.61 
 *Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding   4,427  6,145  72.0%  1.39 
Aircraft Manufacturing          
   General Dynamics Aerospace  6,957  5,171  134.5%  0.74 
   Boeing  62,053  68,281  90.9%  1.10 
Automobile Manufacturing          
    Ford Motor Company  82,002  105,893  77.4%  1.29 
    Toyota Motor Company  29,062  20,530  141.6%  0.71 
Military Armored Vehicle Manufacturing          
    General Dynamics Combat Systems  9,342  9,645  96.9%  1.03 
Health Care          
   Bayer  51,042  31,168  163.8%  0.61 
*Northrop Grumman Data is from 2008 Annual Report       
(Note: Generated from 2009 Annual Reports) 
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D. CAPACITY MEASURES 
1. Industrial Production by Industry 
A crucial question in determining the best place for government investment 
dollars is whether a sector will be able to deliver the items procured (and, thus, the 
economic impact) in a timely manner.  “In order for an increase in government 
procurement to have an immediate impact on the economy, a sector must have sufficient 
spare capacity to absorb the additional demand” (Oxford Economics, 2009).  The 
capacity of a specific sector is, therefore, a measurement reflecting the ability of that 
sector to provide a timely return.  The U.S. Federal Reserve Board calculates quarterly 
industrial production measures and capacity utilization rates for various manufacturing, 
mining, and electric and gas utilities sectors.  Quarterly production output is compared to 
a 2002 baseline output and reported by sector group according to NAICS classification 
code.  The full procedure used by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board is included in 
Appendix B. 
The Industrial Production Index reported measures “the real output of the 
manufacturing, mining, and electric and gas utilities industries; the reference period for 
the index is 2002” (U.S. Federal Reserve Board [FRB], 2009).  Data is collected from 
two main sources: (1) output measured in physical units, and (2) data on inputs to the 
production process, from which output is inferred.  Details of the Federal Reserve 
Board’s procedure are included in Appendix B. 
Ship and boatbuilding (3366xx) is an aggregate group that includes shipbuilding 
and repairing (336611) as well as boatbuilding (336612) (U.S. Census, 2010).  According 
to the FRB, the proportion of ship and boatbuilding that is classified as the shipbuilding 
and repairing sector is about 66% (FRB, 2010).  The 66% proportion is calculated by 
using value added in 2006, which the Board estimates as $9.337 million for shipbuilding 
and repairing, compared to $14.072 million for the ship and boatbuilding group.   
Furthermore, based on value added levels in 2006, the shipbuilding and repair 
sector is further divided into military and civilian production.  Of the sector’s $9.337 
million, $7.067 million is due to military orders, while $2.271 is due to civilian demand 
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(the numbers do not add perfectly due to rounding).  Therefore, 76% of the value added 
from NAICS sector code 336611 is due to military shipbuilding and repair.   
Table 11 shows that as of the fourth quarter of 2009, the ship and boatbuilding 
sector is producing 73.7% of its output at the baseline 2002 level.  Some sectors analyzed 
in previous sections of this thesis (nonresidential manufacturing construction and health 
care) could not be included here since the Federal Reserve does not publish production 
data for these sectors.  However, a direct comparison of current (fourth quarter 2009) ship 
and boat production with aircraft manufacturing, automobile manufacturing, total U.S. 
manufacturing, and miscellaneous manufacturing categories is insightful. 
Of the industrial production data considered and reported in Table 11, only the 
automobile manufacturing sector is lower than shipbuilding, at 66.24%.  The automobile 
manufacturing production declined sharply in the first quarter of 2009, presumably due to 
the recession.  The table also shows that while overall U.S. manufacturing production has 
remained relatively constant since the second quarter of 2008, at 145%–147% of 2002 
levels, the ship and boatbuilding sectors have fallen from about 98% to about 74% of its 
2002 baseline over the past six quarters.  Since shipbuilding and repairing is responsible 
for about 66% of the ship and boatbuilding group, one may reasonably conclude that 
shipbuilding and repairing is also operating at about 73.7% of its 2002 production levels. 
Figure 9 best illustrates the downward trend in the industrial production measured 
from the ship and boatbuilding sectors.  Since the second quarter of 2008, over 24% of 
the baseline production level in 2002 has been lost (97.95%–73.68%).  This data suggest 
that the shipbuilding industry may be well positioned to absorb additional output demand 
from military or civilian orders, and thus the economic impact and return quantified in 






Table 11.   Industrial Production for Various Sectors (by Calendar Quarter) as a Percentage of 2002 Baseline  
(From U.S. Federal  Reserve Board, 2010) 
Sector Description  2008Q2  2008Q3  2008Q4  2009Q1  2009Q2  2009Q3  2009Q4 
Automobile  
NAICS=336111, sa  84.39 98.38 78.02 38.47 44.72 59.62 66.24
Ship and boatbuilding  




NAICS=3364‐9, sa  124.22 116.26 110.64 117.98 114.08 116.30 113.41
Aerospace product and 
parts  NAICS=3364, sa  130.51 121.03 113.62 128.69 122.24 124.51 123.35
Manufacturing (NAICS), sa  146.92 147.31 147.45 147.30 146.90 146.33 145.71
Miscellaneous  
NAICS=339, sa  164.26 166.06 167.33 168.02 168.23 168.16 168.05




Figure 9.   Industrial Production as a Percentage of Baseline Levels 
 
2. Capacity Utilization 
For a given industry, “the capacity utilization rate is equal to an output index 
(seasonally adjusted) divided by a capacity index” (FRB, 2009).  The method used to 
capture an industry’s maximum sustainable output, for use in the denominator of the 
capacity calculation, is described in Appendix B.  Not all specific manufacturing 
industries, as classified by NAICS code, are included in the Federal Reserve’s capacity 
utilization data.   The data does not show calculated capacity utilization for shipbuilding 
and repairing (336611); however, data is available for the manufacturing of transportation 
equipment group (336xxx group).   The results are presented in Table 12 and show that 
the United States “transportation equipment” manufacturing industries are producing at 
about 61% of capacity as of the first quarter of 2010.  The median capacity of the selected 
industries listed in Table 12 is 69.5%.  According to this data, the manufacturing of wood 
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products is the lowest utilized sector of U.S. manufacturing at a mere 50.6% utilization, 
while the oil and gas extraction industry is operating at about a 97.8% utilization rate.  
The data clearly show that the industries classified as “manufacturing of vehicles and 
transportation equipment,” which includes the nation’s shipyards, are operating below the 
median capacity utilization rate for the U.S. manufacturing, mining, and electric and gas 
utilities.   
The Federal Reserve’s publication entitled Industry Structure of Industrial 
Production shows that ship and boatbuilding (3366xx subgroup) comprises about 5.2% of 
the calculation for the transportation equipment manufacturing (FRB, 2010).  This 
proportion is calculated by considering the value added in 2006.  The publication reports 
that ship and boatbuilding added about $14.072 million in 2006, while the transportation 
equipment manufacturing group added $271.111 million.  Thus, the available 
calculations for capacity utilization rate do not show conclusively that shipbuilding is 
below capacity.  However, Table 12 is included here to support the conclusions from the 
Industrial Production trends and does show an opportunity for timely return from an 
increased demand in manufacturing transportation equipment. 
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Table 12.   Capacity Utilization Rates of Selected Manufacturing, Mining, and Electric/Gas 








Wood product NAICS=321, sa  50.3  50.0  50.6 
Nonmetallic mineral product NAICS=327, sa  57.1  54.7  53.9 
Motor vehicles and parts NAICS=3361‐3, sa  48.4  51.8  54.2 
Furniture and related product NAICS=337, sa  57.6  57.6  58.0 
Transportation equipment NAICS=336, sa  58.8  60.1  61.1 
Other manufacturing, sa  62.8  63.7  61.9 
Machinery NAICS=333, sa  57.0  58.8  62.1 
Support activities for mining NAICS=213, sa  48.8  53.7  62.5 
Semiconductors and related equipment, sa  60.0  59.2  63.1 
Primary metal NAICS=331, sa  53.3  58.8  63.4 
Durable manufacturing (NAICS), sa  60.7  61.8  63.5 
Leather and allied product NAICS=316, sa  55.0  58.1  64.6 
Textile product mills NAICS=314, sa  62.1  63.8  65.5 
Fabricated metal product NAICS=332, sa  62.7  64.2  66.1 
Textiles and products NAICS=313,4, sa  59.5  64.5  66.3 
Beverage and tobacco product NAICS=312, sa  64.4  66.2  66.4 
Computer and electronic product NAICS=334, sa  63.9  64.1  67.0 
Textile mills NAICS=313, sa  57.1  65.0  67.0 
Miscellaneous NAICS=339, sa  67.9  69.0  68.6 
Primary & semifinished processing (capacity), sa  67.0  68.5  69.7 
Manufacturing (NAICS), sa  67.2  68.4  69.9 
Finished processing (capacity), sa  68.5  69.8  71.4 
Aerospace and miscellaneous transportation eq.  NAICS=3364‐9, sa  75.6  73.7  72.3 
Plastics and rubber products NAICS=326, sa  66.7  69.3  72.6 
Electrical equipment, appliance, and component  NAICS=335, sa  70.0  70.6  72.8 
Total index, sa  70.0  71.4  73.0 
Apparel and leather goods NAICS=315,6, sa  65.7  67.5  73.2 
Paper NAICS=322, sa  73.6  74.2  73.8 
Apparel NAICS=315, sa  68.1  69.6  74.9 
Chemical NAICS=325, sa  72.0  73.4  75.1 
Mining (except oil and gas) NAICS=212, sa  74.5  72.7  76.3 
Nondurable manufacturing (NAICS), sa  74.2  75.5  76.7 
Petroleum and coal products NAICS=324, sa  84.3  82.8  80.7 
Food NAICS=311, sa  79.9  81.2  82.6 
Crude processing (capacity), sa  82.4  83.9  86.4 
Mining NAICS=21, sa  83.2  84.7  88.3 
Oil and gas extraction NAICS=211, sa  96.6  97.9  97.8 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
1. Monetary Impact 
 According to the input/output analysis conducted via Carnegie Mellon’s EIO-
LCA, a notional increase in final demand from the shipbuilding sector of $1 billion 
would produce about $2.09 billion of direct and indirect economic activity.  The 
$1 billion of final output delivered would include about $570 million of supply chain or 
raw materials purchases and about $430 million of value added, or GDP growth 
(Carnegie, n.p.).  In addition to the $1 billion output, direct economic effects would be 
$570 million, while total indirect effects would be $520 million (totaling $2.09 billion).  
Throughout the U.S. economy, at least 410 different sectors, as classified by 6-digit 
NAICS codes, would benefit from an increased demand in shipbuilding. 
 Five other sectors of the U.S. economy were analyzed using the same notional 
increase in final demand of $1 billion: automobile manufacturing, aircraft manufacturing, 
military armored vehicle and tank parts manufacturing, nonresidential manufacturing 
structures, and the offices of physicians, dentists, and health care practitioners.  Although 
shipbuilding’s $2.09 of generated economic activity ranks fourth of the six sectors 
considered, shipbuilding represents the most even balance between supply-chain 
purchases and value added by the sector itself.  Since all Leontief models are linear, 
results generated will be interpreted in proportion to those presented for any notional 
increase in final demand.  The $570 million of material purchases needed to create 
$1 billion of output, therefore, means that the shipbuilding sector must spend about 57% 
of its revenue from its customers on purchases from its suppliers.  Moreover, 43% of its 
sales or output includes value added by the shipbuilding sector itself.  In contrast, the 
automobile-manufacturing sector, which ranks first in generating total economic activity, 
requires about 74% of its final output value in direct purchases used, meaning that only 
26% is value added. 
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 This shipbuilding and repairing sector, as a possible investment of government tax 
revenue, represents the best balance between material purchases (generating activity 
throughout the supply chain), and value added in the sector itself—which, since value 
added includes the salaries and efforts of workers within the shipbuilding sector, 
generates jobs. 
 A more accurate measure of total economic impact is a Type II multiplier, which 
includes the spending by labor of earnings within the industry.  By calculating the 
consumption multiplier for the household sector, using an estimated nationwide savings 
rate of 5% and an average tax rate of 29%, one may approximate the conversion of a 
multiplier from Type I to Type II.  The consumption multiplier calculated was 3.07, 
which implies that the ratio of all factors considered in Type II will be 3.07 times larger 
than only the direct and indirect impacts considered in Type I multiplier derivation.  The 
process reveals that the sum of direct, indirect, and induced impacts represented in the 
Type II multiplier is about $3.35 billion of activity for every $1 billion of additional 
investment, or sector demand.  The use of a Type II multiplier does not change the 
ranking of the shipbuilding sector as compared to the other five, but it does most 
accurately reflect the economic activity generated by increased demand from the 
shipbuilding industry.  These Type II multipliers “are the most commonly used 
multipliers” (BEA, 1997).     
 Since almost all SCN funding results in a demand within the shipbuilding sector, 
the calculated multiplier may be used to estimate the nationwide economic impact of 
SCN funding on the U.S. economy.  The results show that current SCN funding of $13.8 
billion (as proposed in the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget), will contribute about 
$46.2 billion of economy activity and over $5.9 billion to U.S. GDP.  Increasing the 
Navy’s budget for SCN to $20 billion would result in over $67 billion of activity 
throughout the nation, with more than $8.6 billion contributed to GDP. 
2. Labor Market Impact 
 The Carnegie Mellon EIO-LCA model estimates that about 16,700 employees are 
needed throughout the supply chain in order to produce an additional $1 billion of 
product from the shipbuilding industry.  This labor-market estimate places the 
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shipbuilding sector first of the six sectors considered.  Furthermore, the RIMS II 
model purchased from the BEA Web site, which produces regional results listed by state, 
shows an average (only considering states with employees supported greater than 1) of 
14.1 job supported for every $1 million of increased final demand.  Once again, since 
linear interpolation may be used in these models relying on input/output tables, this 
would suggest 14,100 jobs for an increased demand of $1 billion.  The RIMS II model 
may have a lower estimate since its regional data is from 2006, while the Carnegie 
Mellon employment estimator model is using data from the 1997 benchmark.  Nine years 
of increased automation of many processes within most industries may now result in less 
employment needed for manufacturing-related tasks.   A comparison between industries 
was not conducted for the RIMS II model, but one likely conclusion is that the other 
manufacturing sectors considered have also experienced more growth in automation, 
resulting in fewer jobs supported. 
 NAVSEA provided data on employment levels at the nations “big 6” shipyards, 
which show a clearly declining trend.  Since 1990, 30% of the jobs at U.S. private 
shipyards have been lost.  As logic would suggest, employment numbers seem to be 
correlated with demand since Electric Boat fell from 24,797 employees in 1985 to just 
8,646 in 2000, and only produced one submarine from 1998 to 2003.  In addition, 
NAVSEA’s Portfolio Assessment Team concluded that shipyard jobs contribute between 
six and nine times as much to state GDP per worker as an average job within the state 
(Wright & Fields, 2009). 
 The RIMS II model supports the Carnegie Mellon model’s estimate of 2.09 for a 
direct and indirect multiplier, but differed in its estimation of the induced multiplier.  
Perhaps the discrepancy may be explained by varying spending habits and taxation rules 
across states.  Since the BEA explicitly states that the RIMS II model cannot be used to 
predict nationwide impacts, the Carnegie Mellon model’s multiplier, converted to 
account for household consumption, was considered a more valid approximation of 
induced effects. 
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3. Capital Intensity 
 Oxford Economics has published that “sectors that invest the most in capital and 
labor present the greatest potential for losses if they fail” (2009).  The data collected for 
total assets of various companies, including General Dynamics Marine Systems and 
Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, were scattered due to depreciation methods and asset 
valuation methods.  If the current replacement cost of fixed assets were used, one could 
argue that much higher capital intensity ratios would exist for shipyards.  Although such 
a calculation of replacement cost is beyond the scope of this research, the principle of the 
shipbuilding industry’s highly capital-intensive structure that reflects a high potential loss 
for the nation’s productivity is pertinent.  Although the collected data did not support this 
notion as anticipated, the most likely reason is a heavily depreciated representation of old 
assets in place at shipyards, which inaccurately represents their true replacement or 
historical value. 
4. Capacity Measures 
 The data from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board clearly show that the shipbuilding 
and repair sector includes sufficient spare capacity to absorb an increase in demand for 
products (ships).  The sector’s capacity utilization was estimated using two sources of 
data from the Federal Reserve Board.  First, industrial production as a percentage of a 
baseline of measured real output in 2002 is about 74%.  Secondly, the capacity utilization 
ratio calculated for shipbuilding’s aggregate group “manufacturing of transportation 
equipment,” show production at about 61% of capacity as of the first quarter of 2010.  
Since labor and capital are the two main factors of production, and NAVSEA labor data 
shows a growth in private shipyard employment since 2002, one may conclude that U.S. 
shipyards are operating well below capacity. 
 An evaluation of capacity utilization rates calculated by the Federal Reserve 
Board also supports the conclusion that the transportation equipment manufacturing 
sectors, which includes shipbuilding, is operating well below capacity.  The industry is 
well positioned for the economic impacts described in earlier sections to have a timely 
positive impact on the U.S. economy. 
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B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. For the Shipbuilders 
 Although the stimulus packages of 2008 and 2009 have passed without much 
immediate benefit to the shipbuilding industry, decision makers continue to seek 
investments that provide economic benefit, strong GDP growth, and job creation.  Using 
the Oxford methodology and this study as a “spring board,” the shipbuilding industry and 
the American Shipbuilding Association could present a well-reasoned and similarly 
structured economic argument for additional shipbuilding investment from the U.S. 
government.  The measures of monetary and labor impact, combined with an estimation 
of the timing of such an impact through capacity measures, are mutually supportive in 
presenting a sound economic case. 
Although the U.S. Federal Reserve Data suggest that the shipbuilding and repair 
sector is only operating at about 74% of its industrial production in 2002, there are 
currently 3% more employees throughout the nation’s “big 6” shipyards than there were 
in 2002.13  Clearly, the capacity exists within the shipbuilding sector to absorb large 
increases in demand from commercial as well as U.S. Navy customers.  The onus lies 
within the shipbuilding industry to communicate this opportunity to its customer base. 
The data evaluated suggest steady revenues and healthy profit margins from 
shipbuilding businesses.  Additional investments in capital infrastructure such as crane 
facilities and dry-docks will only strengthen the sector’s average capital-intensity ratio, 
which will support the powerful argument that a loss in demand could lead to a 
permanent loss in “productive capacity” (Oxford Economics, 2004).   
2. For the Navy 
 As described in Chapter I, the unique ability of U.S. warships to project national 
interests abroad, preserve free trade on the high seas, and ensure sea control is well 
known.  Given that preservation of these capabilities is within U.S. national interest and 
that the capacity to produce ships within U.S. borders must be maintained, the Navy 
                                                 
13 As calculated from NAVSEA 05C employment data.  A total of 56,496 employees as of December 
1, 2002, compared to 58,357 total employees on January 1, 2009. 
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should strive to better understand the economic benefits of ship construction and repair.  
The multipliers applied here do not end when a ship finishes construction and begins 
operation.  Rather, warships regularly return to yards for maintenance, upkeep, and 
repair.  Therefore, more ships in the fleet will compound the economic benefits described 
herein and provide additional stimulus for sustained U.S. economic recovery. 
 Reaffirming a commitment to a 313-ship Navy requires serious efforts to secure 
funding for such a fleet.  In today’s fiscal environment, economic impact factors must be 
a serious consideration.  Oxford Economics has laid the framework for making a 
comprehensive economic case in their U.K. Defense Industry.  Four of those main 
argument streams have been duplicated here, but the entire Oxford study could be 
digested and re-created by more skillful government entities such as CRS, RAND, and 
Navy think-tanks. 
3. For Congress and the Secretariat 
 America’s naval fleet is at a 93-year low of 286 active warships (ASA, 2009).  
Since the start of the damaging recession of 2008 and 2009, political decision makers 
have strived to identify an appropriate means of economic stimulus.  Clearly, the 
shipbuilding sector itself is not a comprehensive solution to the country’s fiscal dilemma.  
However, increased investments in shipbuilding and repairing can provide a timely 
and substantial return and should be part of the next effort to provide economic 
stimulus.  Specifically, on April 15, Representative Rob Wittman (R-VA) introduced The 
National Shipbuilding Policy Act bill (HR 5035), which would authorize $20 billion each 
year from fiscal year 2011 through 2015 to rebuild America’s Navy.  Congress should 
pass this resolution, possibly providing supporting appropriation of funds from the ARRA, 
of which only $97.4 billion of the $275 billion allocated to “contracts, grants, and loans” 
have been paid out.14  Congress may be confident that doing so will provide a healthy 
benefit in job growth throughout 49 states, as well as about $3.35 billion in increased 
total economic activity for each $1 billion invested. 
 
 
                                                 
14 As of May 2, 2010 (Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, 2010). 
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C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As this research topic and scope developed, far more opportunities for pertinent 
analysis were discovered than time constraints allowed.  Consequently, NPS thesis 
students and other researchers are strongly encouraged to build upon this effort in the 
following specific areas: 
 
 Multiplier Analysis: more sectors of the economy, beyond the six presented 
here, should be analyzed and compared to shipbuilding.  Furthermore, 
regional multipliers could be identified and linked with the spending locations 
of the Navy’s SCN account. 
 
 Labor market: more research should be conducted to demonstrate the true 
regional value of shipyard employment.  Although the nationwide 
unemployment rate is above 9%, several shipyard states such as Mississippi 
(11.5%) and California (12.6%) currently have even higher rates of 
unemployment, combined with a larger dependence on the shipbuilding sector 
than the average state (BLS, 2010). 
 
 Capital intensity: in order to accurately reflect the productivity and value of 
the shipbuilding industry’s long-lived assets, such as property, plant, and 
equipment, replacement cost accounting should be used in the valuation of 
assets and the calculation of capital intensity ratios.  When the assets of 
businesses representing various sectors of the economy are valued a 
replacement cost, the shipbuilding and repairing sector should present a high 
capital-intensity ratio—reflecting a substantial and permanent loss of 
productivity to the U.S. economy, if it should fail. 
 
 Capacity: the lower-capacity utilization rate of shipbuilding is fairly 
represented by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board Data.  However, interviews 
could be conducted with managers from a single shipyard in order to more 




1. Life Cycle Benefit 
The relatively long life cycle of 30 to 40 years, along with increased maintenance 
activity for ships, gives the shipbuilding sector a qualitative advantage over alternative 
manufacturing such as tanks and automobiles.  The complete economic “lifecycle 
benefit” of ship construction has been only introduced in this study.  A profound 
opportunity exists to leverage the uniquely long life cycle of a ship and apply the 
economic activity generated—not just in its construction but also in its operations and 
support (crew manning, port visits), as well as in its maintenance availabilities at public 
and private shipyards throughout the country.  For instance, neither an armored tank nor 
an automobile will enter dry-dock for a one-year period, providing public or private 
shipyard labor with employment activity, and providing the local economy with hundreds 
of sailors spending their salaries.  This research has provided a broad introduction to the 
exciting topic of the economic benefits of shipbuilding and will hopefully serve as a 
starting point for future research efforts. 
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APPENDIX A:  QUESTIONS LIST 
Goal:  Consultation with interested and informed parties 
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APPENDIX B:  FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD PROCEDURES 
Source:  U.S. Federal Reserve Board 
 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION EXPLANATORY NOTES 
 
Coverage. The industrial production (IP) index measures the real output of the 
manufacturing, mining, and electric and gas utilities industries; the reference period for 
the index is 2002. Manufacturing consists of those industries included in the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) definition of manufacturing plus those 
industries–newspaper, periodical, book, and directory publishing plus logging–that have 
traditionally been considered to be manufacturing. For the period since 1997, the total IP 
index has been constructed from 312 individual series based on the 2002 NAICS codes. 
These individual series are classified in two ways: (1) market groups, and (2) industry 
groups. Market groups consist of products and materials. Total products are the aggregate 
of final products, such as consumer goods and equipment, and nonindustrial supplies 
(which are inputs to nonindustrial sectors). Materials are inputs in the manufacture of 
products. Major industry groups include three-digit NAICS industries and aggregates of 
these industries--for example, durable and nondurable manufacturing, mining, and 
utilities. A complete description of the market and industry structures, including details 
regarding series classification, relative importance weights, and data sources, is available 
on the Board's web site  
Source Data. On a monthly basis, the individual indexes of industrial production are 
constructed from two main types of source data: (1) output measured in physical units 
and (2) data on inputs to the production process, from which output is inferred. Data on 
physical products, such as tons of steel or barrels of oil, are obtained from private trade 
associations and from government agencies; data of this type are used to estimate 
monthly IP wherever possible and appropriate. Production indexes for a few industries 
are derived by dividing estimated nominal output (calculated using unit production and 
unit values or sales) by a corresponding Fisher price index; the most notable of these fall 
within the high-technology grouping and include computers, communications equipment, 
and semiconductors. When suitable direct measures of product are not available, 
estimates of output are based on production-worker hours by industry. Data on hours 
worked by production workers are collected in the monthly establishment survey 
conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The factors used to convert inputs into 
estimates of production are based on historical relationships between the inputs and the 
comprehensive annual data used to benchmark the IP indexes; these factors also may be 
influenced by technological or cyclical developments. The annual data used in 
benchmarking the individual IP indexes are constructed from a variety of source data, 
such as the quinquennial Censuses of Manufactures and Mineral Industries and the 
Annual Survey of Manufactures, prepared by the Bureau of the Census; the Minerals 
Yearbook, prepared by the United States Geological Survey of the Department of the 
Interior; and publications of the Department of Energy.  
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Aggregation Methodology and Weights. The aggregation method for the IP index is a 
version of the Fisher-ideal index formula. (For a detailed discussion of the aggregation 
method, see the Federal Reserve Bulletins of February 1997 and March 2001.) In the IP 
index, series that measure the output of an individual industry are combined using 
weights derived from their proportion in the total value-added output of all industries. 
The IP index, which extends back to 1919, is built as a chain-type index since 1972. The 
current formula for the growth in monthly IP (or any of the sub-aggregates) since 1972 is 
shown below. An output index for month m is denoted by ImA for aggregate A and Im for 
each of its components. The monthly price measure in the formula (pm) is interpolated 
from an annual series of value added divided by the average annual IP index. 
 
The IP proportions (typically shown in the first column of the relevant tables in the G.17 
release) are estimates of the industries' relative contributions to overall growth in the 
following year. For example, the relative importance weight of the motor vehicles and 
parts industry is about 8 percent. If output in this industry increased 10 percent in a 
month, then this gain would boost growth in total IP by 8/10 percentage point (0.08 x 
10% = 0.8%). To assist users with calculations, the Federal Reserve's web site provides 
supplemental monthly statistics that represent the exact proportionate contribution of a 
monthly change in a component index to the monthly change in the total index.  
Timing. The first estimate of output for a month is published around the 15th of the 
following month. The estimate is preliminary (denoted by the superscript "p" in tables) 
and subject to revision in each of the subsequent five months as new source data become 
available. (Revised estimates are denoted by the superscript "r" in tables.) For the first 
estimate of output for a given month, about 72 percent of the source data (in value-added 
terms) are available; the fraction of available source data increases to 86 percent for 
estimates in the second month that the estimate is published, 95 percent in the third 
month, 98 percent in the fourth month, 99 percent in the fifth month, and 99 percent in 








(Percent of value added in 2008) 
Month of estimate  
Availability of Monthly IP Data in Publication Window
  
Type of Data  
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
Physical product  30  44  54  56  57  57
Production-worker hours   42   42   42   42   42   42
           
IP data received  72  86  95  98  99  99
IP data estimated  28  14  5  2  1  1
NOTE: The physical product group includes series based on either monthly or quarterly 
data. As can be seen in the first row of the table, in the first month, a physical product 
indicator is available for about half of the series (in terms of value added) that ultimately 
are based on physical product data (30 percent out of a total of 57 percent). Of the 30 
percent, about two-thirds (19 percent of total IP) include series that are derived from 
weekly physical product data and for which actual monthly data may lag up to several 
months. On average, quarterly product data are received for the fourth estimate of 
industrial production. Specifically, quarterly data are available for the third estimate of 
the last month of a quarter, the fourth estimate of the second month of a quarter, and the 
fifth estimate of the first month of a quarter.  
Seasonal Adjustment. Individual series are seasonally adjusted using Census X-12 
ARIMA. For series based on production-worker hours, the current seasonal factors were 
estimated with data through February 2009; for other series, the factors were estimated 
with data through at least September 2008. Series are pre-adjusted for the effects of 
holidays or business cycles when appropriate. For the data since 1972, all seasonally 
adjusted aggregate indexes are calculated by aggregating the seasonally adjusted indexes 
of the individual series.  
Reliability. The average revision to the level of the total IP index, without regard to sign, 
between the first and the fourth estimates was 0.26 percent during the 1987-2008 period. 
The average revision to the percent change in total IP, without regard to sign, from the 
first to the fourth estimates was 0.21 percentage point during the 1987-2008 period. In 
most cases (about 85 percent), the direction of the change in output indicated by the first 
estimate for a given month is the same as that shown by the fourth estimate.  
Rounding. The published percent changes are calculated from unrounded indexes, and 
may not be the same as percent changes calculated from the rounded indexes shown in 







UTILIZATION RATES CALCULATION METHOD 
Six basic steps are involved in calculating the utilization rates 
published by the Federal Reserve.   
Step 1.  Implied end-of-year indexes of industrial capacity (ICAP) are constructed by 
dividing a production index (IP) by a utilization rate (U) obtained from a survey for an 
end-of-year period (t). [1]  
(1)  ICAPt = IPt / Ut.   
These ratios are expressed, like industrial production, as percentages of production in a 
base year, currently 2002, and give the general level and trend of the capacity estimates.  
After an annual revision of industrial production, the capacity indexes must also be 
revised.  The implied capacity indexes will automatically incorporate revisions to 
production in the estimation of capacity.   
Step 2.  The annual movements of the implied capacity indexes are refined to give 
consideration to alternative indicators of capacity changes; these alternatives include 
capacity data in physical units and estimates of capital input by industry. [2] The Federal 
Reserve’s estimates of annual capacity at the most detailed level are derived from the 
fitted values of regressions that relate the implied capacity indexes to these alternative 
indicators; the regressions are designed to improve the year-to-year changes in the 
implied capacities but to leave their trends intact.   
Specifically, for industries based on utilization rates from the QSPC, the logarithm of 
implied capacity is regressed on industry capital input (K), a deterministic trend (t), the 
age of the capital stock (A) (a proxy for embodied technological change), and occasional 
dummy variables (Di):  
For series based on physical data, an analogous regression is run in which the capital 
input measure is replaced with the measure of physical capacity and the age-of-capital 
variable is omitted.  The fitted values of the regressions are used as the estimates of 
industrial capacity.   
Extrapolations of capacity beyond the latest survey year also are based on the estimated 
model (2), given the trend terms and estimates of capital input and related measures or 
updated estimates of capacity in physical volumes.   
Step 3.  A monthly time series is formed by interpolating between the fourth-quarter 
baseline capacity indexes produced by the regression models.  The interpolation 
procedure allows the monthly rates of increase to change smoothly over time while 
maintaining the same fourth-quarter to fourth-quarter rates of increase as the baseline 
capacity indexes. 
Step 4.  An adjustment may then be applied to estimates of capacity that appear to reflect 
short-term peak capacity rather than a sustainable level of maximum output.  This 
adjustment is most prominent in the capacity index for electricity generation, in which the 
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margin for summer peak loads is removed from the estimates implied by the physical 
data.  An adjustment may also be applied when data sources are changed, to achieve 
continuity and consistency with historical utilization rate levels.   
Step 5.  The monthly capacity aggregates are constructed in three steps:  (1) utilization 
aggregates are calculated on an annual basis through the most recent full year as capacity-
weighted aggregates of individual utilization rates; (2) the resulting annual utilization rate 
is then divided into the corresponding IP aggregate to calculate an annual capacity index; 
and (3) the annual capacity index is interpolated using an annually weighted Fisher index 
of its constituent monthly capacity series to derive the monthly capacity aggregate.   
Step 6.  Utilization rates for the individual series and aggregates are calculated by 
dividing the pertinent monthly production index by the related capacity index. 
Consistency.  A major aim is that the Federal Reserve utilization rates be consistent over 
time so that, for example, a rate of 85 percent means about the same degree of tightness 
that it meant in the past. A major task for the Federal Reserve in developing reasonable 
and consistent time series of capacity and utilization is dealing with inconsistencies 
between the movements of the industrial production index and the survey-based 
utilization rates. The McGraw-Hill/DRI Survey, now discontinued, was the primary 
source of manufacturing utilization rates for many years. This was a survey of large 
companies that reported, on average, higher utilization rates than those reported by 
establishments covered by the annual Survey of Plant Capacity (the primary source of 
factory operating rates through 2006, after which it was discontinued). Adjustments have 
been made to keep the industry utilization rates currently reported by the Federal Reserve 
roughly in line with rates formerly reported by McGraw-Hill. As a consequence, the rates 
reported by the Federal Reserve tend to be higher than the rates reported in the Census 
utilization surveys.    
Weights.  Although each utilization rate is the result of dividing an IP series by a 
corresponding capacity index, aggregate utilization rates are equivalent to combinations 
of individual utilization rates aggregated with proportions that reflect current capacity 
levels of output valued in current-period value added per unit of actual output.  
Perspective.  Over the 1972-2008 period, the average total industry utilization rate is 
80.9 percent; for manufacturing, the average factory operating rate has been 79.6 percent. 
Industrial plants usually operate at capacity utilization rates that are well below 100 
percent: none of the broad aggregates has ever reached 100 percent. For total industry 
and total manufacturing, utilization rates have exceeded 90 percent only in wartime. 
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